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Abstract

This study examined Missouri Assessment Program achievement
scores and teacher salaries to determine if a correlation
existed. Student achievement scores and teacher salaries
were obtained from the Missouri Department of Elementary
and Secondary Education for the 2006-2007 school year.
Analysis of the data indicated there was a significant
correlation between student achievement as measured by the
Missouri Assessment Program and teacher salaries.
This study is part of a companion project. The researchers
collaborated on the research portion of this study. The
researchers shared common goals, defined their roles in the
review of literature and coordinated efforts to produce
this project. Each researcher utilized a different target
population but focused on the same topic.
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CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION
Every year more and more pressure is applied from the
state and federal levels on schools to increase student
achievement. This has brought about policies and systems to
measure performance and strengthen accountability of
schools. One such example is the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB) of 2001. Under this legislation, all students should
perform at a proficient level in the core academic areas by
the year 2014 (Jennings & Rentner, 2006). Teacher quality
and teacher shortages are topics discussed frequently among
educators, lawmakers, and researchers. A high concern are
the quality and number of teachers available in certain
content areas and those available to serve certain groups
of students (Goldhaber, 2003).
Increasing school funding is often considered the
answer to solving the problems of poor student performance.
In response to concerns about teacher supply and quality,
some have called for school districts to move away from the
common practice of basing teacher salaries on degrees and
experience (Hassel, 2002).
Missouri has wide-ranging teacher salary schedules
with varying base salaries and increments. The Missouri
State Teachers Association (MSTA) reported the range in
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base salary in the school year 2006-2007 ranged from
$23,000 to $39,140, with the average teacher salary in the
state of Missouri at $43,524. According to the MSTA annual
survey, Missouri ranked 42nd in the nation for its average
teacher salary in 2006-07 (MSTA, 2007).
Statement of the Problem
This study examined if a correlation exists between
student achievement and average teacher salary. Many school
districts have increased their base salary pay in order to
attract quality teachers to their districts. States have
mandated improved student achievement scores on state exams
and NCLB legislation has significantly increased the
emphasis and accountability for student achievement. In
Missouri, educators are held accountable for Missouri
Assessment Program (MAP) scores. The purpose of this study
was to determine if higher teacher average salary increased
student achievement. MAP index scores in Math and
Communication Arts were used to represent student
achievement. The scores were analyzed by individual subject
area.
Purpose of the Study
Increased student achievement is a goal of all
educators and administration. The purpose of this study was

Teacher Compensation
to determine whether or not teacher compensation is
correlated with student achievement. Standardized test
scores are one indicator of the quality of learning that
takes place at a particular school. Increased teacher
salaries cost school districts and the state money.
Approximately 70% of a school district’s budget is spent on
teacher salaries and benefits (Dees and Keys, 2005). The
following question guided this study:
1. Does increasing teacher pay increase student
achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program?
Additionally, this study was intended to determine if
a positive correlation existed between student achievement
and teacher compensation. Individual school districts must
determine whether spending money on increasing teacher
salaries is a worthwhile cause or if their financial
resources could be better used in other ways.
Increased accountability in public education has
generated debate over the cost-effectiveness of America’s
schools. Taxpayers want to know where dollars are being
spent and whether additional monies for teacher salaries
are justified (Hassel, 2002). This study will help school
districts make an informed decision regarding teacher
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salaries based on student performance of randomly selected
school districts in the state of Missouri.
Null Hypotheses
H0: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured by the mean third through fifth grade index
scores.
H1: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the third grade level in communication arts.
H2: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the third grade level in mathematics.
H3: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fourth grade level in communication arts.
H4: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
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academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fourth grade level in mathematics.
H5: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fifth grade level in communication arts.
H6: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fifth grade level in mathematics.
Definition of Terms
American College Test (ACT). A college-entry exam,
which is taken by a student during his or her sophomore,
junior or senior years (ACT, 2008).
Career ladder: A performance-based compensation
program which provides teachers with opportunities to take
on new roles and responsibilities in addition to their
classroom duties (MDESE, 2008).
Differentiated compensation system. A compensation
system that rewards teachers for being skilled in their
profession (Shanker, 2006).
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Grade level expectations (GLE’s). Grade Level
Expectations for each grade level and subject area at the
secondary level (DESE, 2008).
Merit pay: Supplemental pay based on performance
reviews and for assuming extra responsibilities outside of
the classroom (Blair, 2001).
Missouri Assessment Program (MAP): A performance
based assessment system, as required by the Outstanding
Schools Act of 1993, which is used by all public schools in
the state of Missouri (Ciotti, 1998).
Missouri State Teachers Association (MSTA): The
Missouri State Teachers Association is a grassroots
organization made up of local Community Teachers
Associations in each local school district (MSTA, 2007).
No Child Left Behind (NCLB): Legislation that requires
schools make “adequate yearly progress” in raising student
achievement (Peterson, 2005).
Single-salary schedule: A compensation plan that
compensates teachers based on their years of service and
the number of college degrees earned (Azordegan, et al.,
2005).
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Uniform-salary schedule: A salary schedule which pays
teachers based on their experience and education (Dees &
Keys, 2005).
Assumptions of the Study
1. All districts involved in this study submitted accurate
data to the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education during the 2006-2007 school year.
2. All data reported by the MDESE during the 2006-2007
school year was accurate.
Limitations of the Study
1. The study was limited to academic data gathered from the
2006-2007 school year.
2. The study was limited to students attending third
through fifth grades in Missouri public school districts.
3. The study was comprised of randomly selected school
districts in Missouri.
Summary
This study focused on 300 randomly selected school
districts in the state of Missouri. Data from the 2006-2007
school year were analyzed using Missouri Assessment Program
(MAP) index scores in the areas of Math and Communication
Arts and American College Testing (ACT) district composite
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scores. Researcher A focused on the MAP scores and
Researcher B focused on the American College Test (ACT)
scores. The data were analyzed using a linear regression.
Due to the increase in state and federal mandates to raise
student achievement, educators and policy makers search to
find solutions. The ultimate goal of increasing student
performance causes school districts to utilize school funds
in the most important way. The purpose of this study was to
determine if teacher compensation has a significant impact
on the academic performance of students. The results will
help educators and administrators determine if their
resources are being used in an advisable method.
This study was presented following a five chapter
format, with chapter one providing an introduction to the
study. Chapter two provided an extensive review of relevant
literature in the areas of school reform, achievement
results, and teacher compensation systems. Chapter three
presented the research design and methodology in detail.
Chapter four examined the findings of the study. Chapter
five summarized and analyzed the findings and discussed the
implications for further research and practice.

CHAPTER TWO-REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Introduction
This study was designed to determine whether or not
teacher compensation is correlated with student
achievement. Increased pressure to raise student
achievement makes it important to determine if financial
resources are used in the most beneficial manner.
Standardized test scores are an indicator of the quality of
learning that takes place at a particular school
(Gallagher, 2002). The increase in teacher salaries costs
school districts and the state money. A portion of every
dollar a district receives is spent on instructional items
such as salaries for classroom teachers, supplies, and
professional development (Dees and Keys, 2005).
Approximately 66% of a school district’s budget is spent on
teacher salaries and benefits (Brunner, 2004). School
districts can determine if the school budget dedicated to
teacher salaries is a worthwhile cause or if their
financial resources could be better used in other ways.
In the debate over public education, great teaching is
vital. Research, not opinion, shows that teachers have a
greater impact on student achievement than any other
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educational factor (Hassel, 2002). During the past decade,
efforts to improve public education have made great strides
including a focus on accountability, school choice
expansion, and a commitment to invest in the future of
education (Hassel, 2002). It is unfathomable to imagine
improvements in education without dramatic improvements in
teaching.

Teaching experience is loosely related to

teaching quality, especially beyond the first few years in
teaching (Hassel, 2002).
In order to improve teaching, educators must entice
more people with high teaching potential to the profession,
convince effective teachers to remain in the classroom,
encourage and support great teachers to take on tough
teaching assignments, support teachers with professional
development to increase student achievement, and encourage
ineffective teachers to withdraw from the profession
(Hanushek & Rivkin, 2007). Are dollars spent on teacher
salaries and benefits linked to improved teacher quality
and student performance? It is important to focus on how
teachers’ experience and education, the characteristics
traditionally rewarded in teacher salary schedules, effect
student achievement. Many states are restructuring teacher
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compensation systems to enhance teacher quality based on
these elements (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2007).
Researcher Lisa May compiled portions of Chapter II
relative to the American College Test (ACT), single-salary
pay schedules, NCLB, and public schools with student
populations exceeding 1,500 or more. Researcher Doug Arnold
focused on the Missouri Assessment Program (MAP), merit
pay, career ladder, alternative pay methods, and public
schools with student populations of fewer than 1,500
students.
Salary Schedules
The vast majority of United States school districts
base teacher pay on a single-salary schedule that rewards
years of experience in combination with degrees earned or
advanced courses taken (Odden, 2000). How teachers are paid
is once again a hot political issue with a number of
legislators across the nation. Many are calling for a shift
away from the seniority-based pay system and would prefer
to have a compensation system that is tied to student
results.
The single-salary teacher compensation structure has
been in place across the United States for at least the
last 50 years (Odden, 2000). By 1950, 97 percent of all
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schools adopted the single-salary structure which provides
teachers monetary and incentive rewards based on years of
experience in the profession and the number of college
degrees earned. This formula for calculating teacher
salaries assumes that teaching effectiveness is increased
with experience and completion of advanced degrees
increases teaching ability and performance in the
classroom. This structure has been criticized for not
providing opportunities for teachers to be rewarded for
using good teaching methods and for not holding teachers
accountable for student learning. In response to this
structure, merit pay systems were developed.
In the early 2000s, public elementary and secondary
schools spent roughly $180 billion on teachers’ salaries and
benefits, about half of their total expenditures (Dees &
Keys, 2005). Most of this was distributed according to a
fixed salary schedule. A uniform-salary schedule pays
teachers based only on their experience and education (Dees
& Keys, 2005). In an effort to maximize the investment
return, states and school districts across the country have
experimented with a variety of teacher compensation
methods, including linking teacher pay to student
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performance. The main types of teacher compensation systems
include the single-salary structure and the performancebased compensation system (Plucker, 2005).
Teacher unions have defended a standard single-salary
schedule in the name of employee equity and fairness. The
1970’s and 1980’s brought experiments with merit pay. In
this system, teachers were awarded pay increases based on
their administrator’s personal judgment of their prior
year’s performance (Azordegan, et al., 2005).
With the single-salary schedule system, a teacher is
rewarded for his or her years of service and for the number
of college degrees earned. This system assumes that
teaching ability increases with experience and completion
of college degrees increases teaching ability and
performance in the classroom. Teachers working in this
system feel the freedom to help and work with one another
instead of hiding their strategies and techniques (Heneman,
2006).
The single-salary structure has been criticized for
not providing opportunities for teachers to be rewarded for
using outstanding teaching methods and for not holding
teachers accountable for students’ learning. Quality
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teachers are paid the same as those teachers who do not
perform as well. This has a negative impact on recruiting
high quality individuals to the teaching profession
(Azordegan et al., 2005).
Public School Reform
The idea of results-focused compensation is gaining
credibility due in part to the standards-based
accountability movement. As accountability oriented policy
makers work to ensure alignment of curriculum and
assessment they confront the reality that student
performance hinges on effective teaching. President Bush’s
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation recognized this
reality in its requirement of a qualified teacher in every
classroom. Educators and legislators are constantly seeking
policies and programs that will increase student
achievement scores (Peterson, 2005). NCLB is the most
recent federal legislation to impact public education. The
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was passed in
1965 while Lyndon Johnson was president. Federal
legislators were careful not to infringe on states’ rights
to make decisions on curriculum and the general operations
of schools. The ESEA seemed to promise that the federal
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government’s role in education would decrease the
achievement gap between students of differing backgrounds.
One of the most interesting pieces of ESEA was that it
would not place higher restrictions on public schools that
were succeeding academically. As federal dollars increased,
the aspiration for accountably rose (Standerfer, 2006).
Comprehensive school reform was integrated into the
1994 reauthorization of the federal ESEA. Schools in which
at least 50 percent of the student population was
disadvantaged were encouraged to implement school-wide
reforms. In 1997, Congress created the Comprehensive School
Reform Demonstration program.

This program required

schools to address nine components in their school
improvement plans to be eligible for program grants. Some
of these components were professional development, greater
parent and community involvement, measurable goals for
student achievement, and annual evaluation of both
implementation and achievement results (Education
Commission of the States, 2004).
Toward the end of the 1960’s, the National Assessment
of Educational Progress (NAEP) test was introduced as a way
to monitor and evaluate student learning. Test scores were
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reported regionally with the intent of monitoring how
schools performed. This monitoring led to competition of
student achievement among states and within states
(Standerfer, 2006).
During the 1970s, various school reform issues and
programs developed, including special education
legislation. ESEA, however, did not deliver the anticipated
corrections to the achievement gap (Standerfer, 2006).
The 1980’s were noted by the National Commission on
Excellence in Education’s report A Nation at Risk. This
description painted a picture of failure and indicated that
if the United States did not make drastic changes to the
way the United States educate children our economic
competitiveness would diminish globally. In 1989, an
educational summit was held by the National Governors’
Association. President George H. Bush was the commander-inchief during this time. This era marked the expansion of
content standards at the federal level for core subject
areas (Standerfer, 2006). In 1993, Bill Clinton introduced
Goals 2000 legislation and the reauthorization of ESEA as
the Improving America’s Schools Act, which mandated schools
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generate academic standards in core areas that would be
assessed (Christenson, 2007).
The NCLB Act was passed in 2001 under President George
W. Bush’s administration. NCLB gives schools and country
groundbreaking education reform, based on stronger
accountability for results, more flexibility for states and
communities, encouragement of proven education methods, and
more options for parents. Congress approved the No Child
Left Behind Act, a new reauthorization of the ESEA, and
incorporated Comprehensive School Reform Demonstration
components into Title I. Under Title I, the largest federal
K-12 program, schools identified as needing improvement
must practice strategies designed to improve student
achievement. Strategies must be based on scientific
research demonstrating effectiveness (Education Commission
of the States, 2004). This signature reform regulation
requires all students in grades 3-8 to be annually tested.
The objective of NCLB is to elevate academic achievement
for all students regardless of their ethnicity or
background. President Bush also desired to close the gap
that separated students of color and low-income students
from their peers (Peterson, 2005).
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No Child Left Behind
The NCLB Act has shifted the focus of the education
system from inputs to outcomes and has required student
achievement scores to meet certain standards. Accomplishing
the student performance goals of the NCLB federal
guidelines requires better use of educational dollars. In
the past 50 years, there has been a change in how
educational dollars are spent. In the 1950s, the majority
of education dollars were spent on regular classroom
teachers such as math, science, reading/writing, and
history. Today, a significant amount of money is spent on
art, music, vocational education, family and consumer
education, and health and physical education teachers.
Money is also spent on instructional aides to help students
who struggle academically (Odden, 2007). NCLB attempts to
hold schools responsible for making academic improvement
with students. NCLB utilizes Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)
as a method for doing so. AYP does not measure the annual
progress of the same students; therefore, the achievement
gaps are not effectively addressed. For example, 3rd grade
students in the state of Missouri are tested annually in
communication arts and mathematics. They are then compared
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to the previous year’s students (American Federation of
Teachers, 2005).
The A in AYP stands for the word adequate. The AYP
targets are out of reach (American Federation of Teachers,
2005). By the year 2014, all students across the nation are
expected to be proficient in communication arts and
mathematics. Students learn at different rates and not all
students have the same gifts academically. Therefore,
almost all public schools in the United States will fail
AYP by the year 2014 if not sooner (American Federation of
Teachers, 2005). The accountability with regard to students
should monitor the same students over various periods of
time. A method for testing and tracking students annually
needs to be the focus of NCLB (American Federation of
Teachers, 2005).
Professional development is key for improving
classroom instruction and student learning. Large school
districts invest between $4,000 and $8,000 per teacher per
year on professional development. A large portion of that
time is spent during days in which school is not in session
or during the summer. Research indicates the majority of
professional development is far reaching in content, but
not in-depth enough. Studies also indicate teacher
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professional development has little to do with content in
core subjects and has insignificant impact on teaching and
learning (Odden, 2007). Odden suggested schools conduct an
audit or needs assessment to determine the direction for
professional development. Some examples of how school
districts across the nation have increased student
achievement scores include setting high goals for student
proficiency, analyzing student performance data, reviewing
effective instruction techniques, and investing heavily in
teacher training. These schools have also provided extra
tutoring time for struggling students, created smaller
class sizes, and allocated more time for core subject areas
(Odden, 2007).
The Texas commissioner of education decided to
disregard NCLB mandates for special education testing in
2005. The state of Texas was penalized over $400,000 of its
federal education allocation due to missing a data
reporting deadline (Peterson, 2005).
According to Peterson (2005), “The Bush administration
in April 2005 offered greater flexibility on testing
requirements for students with severe learning
disabilities” (p. 2). Resistance to the overall law

Teacher Compensation

21

increased nonetheless as its requirements became harder to
meet. NCLB requires yearly increases in the number of
students who pass standardized tests in reading and math
until all students are passing by 2014. Missouri and
Florida asked for permission to alter their three-year
stair-step plan to avoid the higher standards and instead
joined five other states (Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois,
Maryland, and North Dakota) that raised testing targets in
smaller, yearly increments (Peterson, 2005).
The disagreements over NCLB are not only about
funding, but also about the federal government providing
stipulations for academic achievement for public schools.
States have always considered education to be a local
decision. Many state legislators argue that because the
federal mandates are unfunded the states should not have to
adhere to the guidelines. President George W. Bush
contended that NCLB is not an unfunded legislative mandate.
He argued that states have received increases in federal
dollars in the three years prior to 2005 (Peterson, 2005).
NCLB has resulted in increased accountability in
public schools. Many state and local administrators believe
that this dependence on tests is too narrow a gauge of
educational achievement. NCLB directed a greater attention
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to low-achieving students and intensified efforts to
improve low-performing school districts. The Center on
Education Policy (CEP) annually collects information for
the purpose of evaluating educational programs. The CEP is
a non-profit research and advocacy organization. The CEP
surveys officials in all state departments of education and
administers a questionnaire to sample schools across
America. They also conduct case studies of individual
schools (Jennings, 2006).
This review of NCLB has produced varied results and
analysis. State and local administrators reported that
student achievement on state tests has risen. Seventy-five
percent of states reported that the scores on state tests
in reading and mathematics were going up. These states
credit their own policies and procedures as important in
attaining these results, although they acknowledge that the
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) has made an impact on these
results as well. NCLB defines student achievement as the
proportion of students who score at the proficient level on
these state exams. States have implemented various
strategies to ensure they maximize their student test
scores. These strategies have resulted in a higher
percentage of their students being counted as proficient.
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Public schools focus on reading and mathematics
performance. NCLB mandates that these two areas be tested
nation-wide. Often this focus results in a decrease in the
time spent on the teaching and learning of social studies,
science, and electives (Jennings, 2006).
Districts have updated and revamped their curriculum
due to NCLB. Schools have analyzed their approach to
instruction and attempted to implement scientific researchbased techniques. NCLB mandates that specific changes occur
in schools that fail to meet AYP for two years in a row.
The most prevalent improvements are curriculum alignment
and instruction relevant to test data (Jennings, 2006).
No Child Left Behind has increased the number of tests
students take and has required teachers to be highly
trained and meet certain academic qualifications. Experts
disagree if these requirements have impacted student
learning. Additionally, there is a struggle for rural
schools where teachers teach several subjects, especially
math, special education, and science (Jennings). Public
schools are more focused than ever on achievement gaps
between groups of students. NCLB requires schools be
responsible for improving academic achievement levels of
all sub groups as well as student achievement as a whole.
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Two areas of concern are special education students and
students who use English as a second language.
Administrators argue they do not see the need to test nonEnglish speaking students, however, NCLB mandates this
(Jennings, 2006).
The federal government is playing a more significant
role in public education due to NCLB. Each state has
assumed greater responsibilities due to the NCLB mandates.
The additional testing that NCLB requires has added a
financial burden to school districts. If a school fails to
meet AYP, the district must also use its resources to
correct the problems; otherwise the state department of
education is required to step in with specific plans of
action (Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education, 2008). No Child Left Behind has impacted the way
public schools test students. It has increased the amount
of testing and the accountability factor. NCLB has impacted
the curriculum of schools and has impacted low-performing
school districts. NCLB has affected the requirement of
teacher qualifications and has had a positive effect on
student test scores in reading and math (Jennings).
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Merit Pay
Harris (2007) indicated the current impetus for a
renewed look at merit pay systems comes from the No Child
Left Behind Act. With this renewed recent interest in the
quality of American schools, merit pay is making a rebound.
Currently Minnesota and Florida have state-wide policies in
place which mandate that every school in the state disperse
a portion of teacher compensation based on student test
score improvements (Makkonen, 2005). The federal government
is also supporting this effort with financial resources for
merit pay structures. The Department of Education’s Teacher
Incentive Fund (TIF) will grant up to a total of $99
million for the design and execution of performance and
outcome-based compensation systems in high-need schools. In
2006, 16 TIF grants were distributed totaling $42 million
(Makkonen, 2005).
The National Commission on Teaching and America’s
Future has ranked the United States progress toward having
a qualified teacher in every classroom. The most recent
summary report identified teacher retention as the number
one problem for schools today (Makkonen, 2005). The
Commision noted that raising salaries alone is not
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sufficient to address this problem. The commission proposed
adding incentive pay for additional knowledge and skills
that contribute to improved student learning (Makkonen,
2005).
There is a focus for creating greater professionalism
of teaching as a career. Many legislators and businessmen
desire to run public schools like businesses. They want to
pay for performance. There are advocates in Denver and
Minneapolis that have given teachers more options by
creating salary schedules with more choices, opportunities
and options (Makkonen, 2005).
Odden (2007) emphasized the strong positive impact of
teacher skills on increasing student performance. He
defined these skills as use of class time efficiently,
administering contemporary, pertinent lessons, and
nurturing a respectful classroom atmosphere. There exists
an absence of competitive salary structures to recruit and
retain skilled teachers. Virtually all teachers are
evaluated annually, and very few are offered extra
compensation for a positive evaluation. Most advances on
the salary schedule for teachers are based on
certifications and college degrees (Odden, 2007).
Differentiated compensation is intended as a way of
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rewarding skilled teachers. It is also being used to
attract them and make sure they are working where they are
most needed. In the current differentiated-pay systems,
teachers may receive bonuses, start higher on the salary
schedule, or move more quickly up the scale if they teach
in hard to fill content areas, take on additional
professional responsibilities, acquire valued knowledge and
skills, and/or improve student performance (Makkonen,
2005).
Merit pay systems were designed to supplement the
existing single-salary structure. They provide incentive
pay for teachers based on performance reviews and for
assuming extra responsibilities outside of the classroom.
This system of teacher compensation was known as payment by
results (Gorian, 2000). Under this method, the compensation
given to teachers was determined by the number of students
passing examinations and on student attendance. A concern
that arises when discussing merit pay is that merit pay
systems may promote competition, and not collaboration,
among teachers. Contributing factors may also include
competition among teachers for a fixed amount of bonus
money. A negative effect of such practice could be that a
school’s capacity to reach performance targets would be
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diminished (Gorian, 2000). At the other end of the
spectrum, performance-based compensation models seek to
promote cooperation among faculties and provide incentive
pay to all qualified teachers. Performance-based
compensation models are generally more complicated than
single-salary and require extensive planning to be
effectively executed. These models demand school officials
develop a salary structure that rewards good teaching and
is clearly linked between teacher knowledge and skills and
improvements in student performance. The allocation of
funding to support such systems is an additional challenge
for school districts (Gorian, 2000).
Serious consideration must be given to whether a
school district should offer rewards based on students
meeting a specific achievement level or based on students
making agreed upon academic progress.

Standards-based

awards are most typically seen in a program that rewards
schools for meeting state performance goals, such as making
adequate yearly progress (Koppich, 2005).
In addition to performance-based compensation methods,
some states and school districts have developed career
ladders. Career ladder systems were intended to provide
teachers with opportunities to take on new roles or

Teacher Compensation

29

responsibilities in addition to classroom teaching (MDESE,
2007). There is a mixture of career ladder systems that
work to increase teachers’ skills and responsibilities. They
include performance based ladders, job improvement ladders,
and professional development ladders. Teachers progressing
up these career ladders can be rewarded for their efforts
in a number of areas. More importantly these career ladders
allow teachers to advance along their career path without
removing them from the classroom (NASBE, 2002). School
districts across the nation have implemented variations of
the performance-based compensation and career ladder
programs. These programs differ in configuration; they
include elements of competency-based pay, group-based
performance pay, and pay-for-performance programs (NASBE,
2002).
The Milken Family Foundation Teacher Advancement
Program (TAP) is a performance-based compensation program
that has been implemented in various school districts
across the nation. TAP was created to attract and retain
teachers (Glazerman & Silva, 2006). The elements of the TAP
program include multiple career paths, ongoing applied
professional growth, instructionally focused
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accountability, and performance-based compensation.
Teachers are allowed to investigate career options while
still remaining a classroom teacher. They can also join a
leadership team by taking positions as mentor teachers. The
leadership teams evaluate teachers and set yearly goals for
the school (Glazerman & Silva, 2006). While involved in TAP
the teachers are allowed time during the school day to plan
and visit with other teachers about professional growth.
Mentor teachers lead the group discussions to facilitate
the reflection process. Teachers are compensated based upon
their responsibilities, student success, and evaluations.
They are also rewarded for teaching in hard-to-staff school
districts (Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
TAP school districts in Arizona have noted gains in
student achievement. There were seven schools in Arizona
that implemented the TAP program in 2000-2001 (Glazerman &
Silva, 2006). Student numbers increased involvement in the
TAP program from 949 to 1,571 two years later. The TAP
schools were compared to a control group. The control group
matched the TAP schools based on comparative
characteristics. The characteristics included school size,
minority, location, and achievement (Glazerman & Silva,
2006). Student performance among these groups was measured
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using the reading, math, and language scale scores of the
Stanford Achievement Test for students in grades 2-8
enrolled in both groups. The Stanford Achievement Test
measures reading, mathematics and language abilities of
students. The majority of TAP school districts outperformed
the control group between 2000 and 2003 by 9 to 46
percentile points (Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
In the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP), teacher
salaries and advancements are linked to student achievement
scores. TAP aims to attract talented teachers to the field
and retain them by offering incentive pay. Teacher salary
increases are based on student growth, teacher observation,
qualifications in high need areas, and a willingness to
become a mentor. Professional development is a key
component in the TAP system (Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
The Milken Family Foundation developed TAP in the late
1990s. The program offers teachers opportunities for
additional pay, career advancement, and continual
professional growth. The four principles in TAP include:
multiple career paths, ongoing applied professional growth,
instructionally focused accountability, and performancebased compensation. Teachers have the option of remaining
classroom teachers or being promoted to mentor or master
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teachers. TAP builds time into the school day for targeted
teacher learning that addresses student academic
weaknesses. Teachers meet in teams at designated times
weekly. Each year a teacher is evaluated four to six times
based on his or her students’ progress. Classroom teachers
may earn incentive pay based on both instructional
performance and student performance (Glazerman & Silva,
2006). The Milken group provides support for schools who
implement the program. They offer training and
certification services to prepare master and mentor
teachers for evaluating other teachers as well as
conducting the professional development sessions. Each
school designates the amount of salary incentives.
TAP schools across the nation have a range for master
teachers of $5,000 - $11,000, and bonuses for mentor
teachers are between $2,000 and $5,000. Teacher performance
bonuses have three parts. Fifty percent of the bonus is
tied to the observed teacher evaluation, 30% is based on
student academic improvement, and 20% is based on schoolwide academic improvements. TAP recommends $2,500 per
teacher for annual performance rewards (Glazerman & Silva,
2006). In order for schools to become TAP schools, the
staff must vote to express support for the new program. The
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selection is competitive and not every applicant is chosen.
Schools must show a financial commitment to the program.
Since the start of the program in 2002, TAP schools have
seen changes in enrollment figures. It appears the main
reason for schools discontinuing the program is lack of
funding. A study in Arizona and South Carolina showed
greater student achievement gains than their comparison
schools. States that have implemented TAP include: Florida,
Colorado, Arkansas, South Carolina, Minnesota, Arizona, and
Louisiana (Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
South Carolina also participated in the TAP program in
recent years. In 2002-2003, there were over 2,000 South
Carolina students enrolled in TAP schools. A control group
was formed, much like Arizona, where similar students
within the South Carolina school system were chosen and
tested utilizing the Palmetto Achievement Challenge Test
(PACT). Students in grades 3-8 were tested on reading,
language, and math. TAP mathematics students outperformed
control group students by 14 to 27 percentile points, and
TAP reading students outperformed control group students by
6 to 26 percentile points (Plucker, 2005). There are some
private school districts in Indiana that have utilized
performance-based salary packages as well. Catholic schools
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in Indianapolis have implemented the Milken TAP program and
have witnessed increased results. After implementing the
TAP program, 100 percent of the 6th graders passed the
mathematics portion of their standardized test (Plucker,
2005).
The Denver, Colorado, school system implemented a new
compensation package for Denver’s teachers in 2004. The
Professional Compensation System for Teachers pays annual
salary increases to teachers whose students have
demonstrated academic improvement and to teachers in
schools who show gains in performance (Plucker, 2005).
Teachers may also receive compensation for acquiring
additional knowledge and skills that are related to their
core teaching area. Teachers may also receive monetary
increases in pay if they teach in hard-to-fill areas in
low-performing schools (Plucker, 2005).
Officials in the Denver system had difficulty linking
teacher and student performance data and assessing
nonacademic teachers’ performance relative to compensation.
Based on these pay-for-performance areas of concern, the
program was revised to include incentives for teachers to
earn professional development units, meet student growth
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objectives and serve in hard-to-fill positions (Plucker,
2005). To evaluate the impact of their new salary system,
the Denver School District conducted an analysis to compare
student performance with a control group that did not
utilize the new salary system. Students were tested on
standardized exams including the Iowa Test of Basic Skills
and the Colorado Student Assessment Program (Plucker,
2005). The control group was selected based on free and
reduced lunch rates, percent of English as a second
language, and school size. The elementary pilot students’
scores were lower than the control students’ scores on all
tests except the Iowa test language portion. The pilot
middle school students’ scores were higher than the control
group’s scores in the areas of reading, writing, and math.
The high school students at the pilot school districts had
significantly higher increases than their counterparts in
the control group, especially in the areas of math and
language (Plucker, 2005).
Denver, Colorado began a pay-for-performance system
during the 1999-2000 school year. The program ran from 1999
to 2003 in 16 schools. Denver linked teacher pay to student
achievement. Students in grades K – 12 who attended these
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16 schools outperformed students whose teachers received a
higher evaluation than whose teachers who did not
(Azordegan, et al., 2005). Students of teachers who met two
objectives on the rubric scoring guide had significantly
higher test scores than students of teachers who met one or
no objectives. The system has four components with nine
elements through which teachers could earn compensation.
The plan, Professional Compensation Plan for Teachers, was
adopted by the Denver Public School system in 2004
(Azordegan, et al., 2005). Teachers worked with their
principal to set annual goals. Those teachers who met their
goals received a salary index increase of 1% and those
teachers who did not meet their goals received zero
increase. Teachers whose students achieved above the normal
one year growth on the state assessment received a 3%
increase in salary. Teachers who worked in schools that
earned special recognition based on accreditation factors
received a 2% bonus. The factors were related to attendance
and graduation rates. Those that attended a Professional
Development Unit in their content area received a 2%
increase in salary (Azordegan, et al., 2005). Teachers who
garnered a National Board Certificate received a salary
increase of 9%. Those teachers who taught in hard-to-fill
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areas received a 3% salary increase. Denver also rewarded
teachers who worked in schools with a high free and reduced
lunch count. Those teachers earned a 3% increase in salary.
If a teacher received a satisfactory evaluation, they
earned a 3% increase in salary (Azordegan, et al., 2005).
The South Carolina School Incentive Reward Program
(SIRP) has the longest running tenure among performance
plans in the United States. Implemented in 1984, the SIRP
awards school districts financially based on several
criteria (Plucker, 2005). Each school is placed in one of
five areas based on the school’s percentage of students
receiving free lunches, reduced-priced lunches, teacher’s
average years of education beyond a bachelor’s degree, and
percentage of students meeting or exceeding standardized
test score minimums. All schools compete with each other
based upon the band in which they fall (Plucker, 2005).
Band 1 consists of low-performing schools with the highest
percentage of students receiving free or reduced lunch, and
Band 5 consists of higher performing schools with the
lowest percentage of students receiving free or reduced
lunch. Index scores are calculated for each school based on
three criteria: (1) student achievement, (2) teacher
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attendance, and (3) student attendance. Student attendance
is the most critical measure. In order to be eligible for
an award a school must meet the minimum improvement index
based on its grouping category (Plucker, 2005).
Student achievement is calculated utilizing
standardized test scores. The tests include a version of
the Boem Readiness Tests, a South Carolina criterionreferenced test. By and large, schools have shown
improvement in student performance on standardized exams.
However, student and teacher attendance has not seen
noticeable improvement. Schools in the lowest socioeconomic status band saw the greatest improvement in
student achievement (Plucker, 2005).
Tennessee implemented the Tennessee Value-Added
Assessment System as a measuring tool for student
achievement and teacher productivity. The plan encompassed
teacher recruitment and retention, and tried to attract
quality teachers to some of Chattanooga’s lowest performing
schools. It also aimed to increase students’ performance in
reading, language arts, math, science, and social studies.
The pay plan rewards teachers with $5,000 bonuses for
individual teachers and the potential of a $2,000 bonus for
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every teacher in the school if the school receives a high
overall score. Other incentives provided to teachers by the
program include loans toward the purchase of a house, free
legal services, and free tuition toward a master’s degree.
These incentives have increased teacher recruitment and
reduced retention issues. Chattanooga has witnessed
improved student achievement at the nine schools that
participate in this program. The percentage of 3rd graders
reading at or above grade level doubled between 2000 and
2002 (Holland & Soifer, 2004).
Research by Sanders made it more reasonable to
justifiably hold teachers accountable for how much their
students progress during the time they are in a particular
teacher’s charge. Sander’s value-added model attempted to
separate student effects (ethnicity, family background,
socioeconomic status) from school effects (teachers,
administrators, programs). The model projected a test score
for each student based on previous academic achievement.
The difference between the student’s actual score and his
projected score was the value added by the teacher (Wright,
Horn, & Sanders, 1997).
In 1995, Indiana school districts began reimbursing
teachers who obtained the National Board for Professional
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Teaching Standards (NBPTS) certification. Indiana wanted to
promote high-quality teachers and reward those who earned
additional licensure or advanced certification. Teachers
were allowed five release days to prepare for certification
(NCREL, 1999). Teachers who become NBPTS certified are
eligible for placement on the doctoral level of their
salary schedule or may elect to receive $2,000 annually in
addition to their regular salary (Plucker, 2005).
Research on the impact of performance-based pay and
other alternative compensation programs has mostly focused
on their impact on teachers (Dees & Keys, 2005). However,
there has been some research regarding the impact of
alternative teacher compensation on student achievement
outcomes. Research conducted indicated increased student
achievement in areas such as math and reading. Students
have improved academically due to the various alternative
compensation programs (Dees & Keys, 2005).
Teachers play a key role in any school improvement;
political leaders are increasingly interested in programs
which relate educational performance, usually measured by
student achievement test scores, with teacher compensation.
The goal is to provide an incentive which will encourage
improved teaching and learning. There are at least 20
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states where schools are utilizing some sort of bonus
system linked to teacher performance. This number is
projected to grow and is reinforced by the growing
recognition that motivated and skilled teachers are an
important component of real and lasting educational reform
(Lafree, 2000).
One of the major variables in attracting qualified
teachers is the school district’s expenditures and property
tax rates. Inequality in teacher quality between school
districts has been a problem (Van Keuren, 2002). Teachers
are often hesitant to seek employment in large inner-city
centers and rural schools. Property tax wealth and capacity
to pay for quality teachers give uptown schools the
advantage of attracting top quality teachers by offering
superior salaries. Many teachers will not volunteer to
teach in a difficult school. Incentives are being offered
in school districts across the country to attract and
retain teachers in the schools that serve students with the
greatest needs. Some incentives include signing bonuses,
housing subsidies, relocation allowances, free rent and
utilities, loans, grants, low-interest mortgages and help
with down payments and closing costs (Van Keuren, 2002).
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Improving student achievement is a growing concern for
everyone. One could argue that the United States is lacking
because of the unique concept of educating the entire
student population instead of a select few. The belief in
only educating a portion of the population does exist in
some cultures (Gay, 2006). This plays a role in how the
United States is viewed. The United States is perceived to
be inferior due to this fact. However, this fallacy occurs
because the United States tests all students. The United
States does not discriminate between the best and brightest
and the lower-performing student that would not be
receiving an education if he or she lived in another
country (Gay, 2006).
Most of the current literature on the structure of
salary schedules reflects not the views of classroom
teachers but the views of political leaders. Little
literature reflects the views of the classroom teachers,
the ones who impact the quality of teaching and learning
taking place in our schools. Teachers’ views must be taken
into account for school reform to work as it is intended
(Newton, 2000).
In Missouri, MDESE adopted the Missouri Assessment
Program (MAP) test as a measure of student achievement. The
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Outstanding Schools Act of 1993 called for the Show-Me
standards to define the knowledge, skills, and competencies
students needed. The MAP test was aligned to the Show-Me
standards. In order to clarify the Show-Me standards,
curriculum consultants in collaboration with teachers from
across the state have written the Grade-Level Expectations
for communication arts, mathematics, science, and social
studies. The Grade-Level Expectations (GLEs) form the
foundation for the model state curriculum. To comply with
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, the MAP assessments
in math at the 4th, 8th and 10th grade level and
communication arts at the 3rd, 7th, and 11th grade level
were expanded to include math at 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th
grades and communication arts at fourth, fifth, sixth, and
eighth grades. Student performance on the MAP is a major
part of the accreditation process for Missouri public
schools (MDESE, 2008).
The ACT assessment is a standardized examination
required by many colleges and universities in the United
States for admission to undergraduate degree programs (ACT,
2008). The ACT was created in 1959 by E. F. Lindquist, a
professor at the University of Iowa. Lindquist is an expert
in the field of testing which measures the academic
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abilities of prospective college students. The ACT is a
multiple-choice exam that lasts 2 hours, 55 minutes and
measures English, math, reading, and science skills. The
format of the questions in the areas of English, math,
reading, and science has remained the same; however
sections to provide institutions with additional
information about students were added in 1965. Nearly 1.7
million ACT tests are administered each year to prospective
college students (ACT, 2008). Most students take the ACT
during high school in their junior year or at the beginning
of their senior year.

The ACT is scored on a scale of 1 to

36 with nearly half of all students who take the test
scoring in the range of 17 to 23 (ACT, 2008).
During the 2006-2007 school year, 23% of 2007
graduates met all four ACT College Readiness Benchmark
scores. To improve students’ scores and increase the
percentage of students identified as college ready, ACT
suggests providing access for all students to take the ACT,
insuring core curriculum is a priority, making sure
students are taking the right kinds of courses, evaluating
the rigor of courses offered, and planning guidance
activities based on students’ career and college
aspirations. Student scores can increase if these
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suggestions are implemented and evaluated yearly within
school districts (ACT, 2008).
The National Governors Association and the Commission
on the Future of Higher Education both support increased
communication and curricular alignment between
postsecondary institutions and secondary schools. With
augmented alignment students are more likely to be ready
for credit-bearing entry-level college courses. Students
who take higher-level mathematics, social studies, and
science courses in high school are generally more likely to
enroll in college than students who do not.

This has been

found to be true for most gender, race, ethnic, or family
income groups (Robbins, et al., 2006).
In the increasingly complex and specialized global
economy, education and training beyond high school is
essential so high school graduates can earn a selfsufficient living and to support a family. In order to
succeed in college, students must graduate from high school
ready for the demands of post-secondary education. Longterm increase in salary is a strong indicator of career
success and economic well-being. A recent study examined
whether the long-term earnings of first-year college
students can be predicted by their academic preparation in
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high school, as measured by ACT composite scores and the
degree to which their career interests fit their planned
choice of career (Neumann, Olitsky, & Robbins, 2007).
Findings of the study indicated as ACT composite scores
increased, average salary increased. The positive
relationship between ACT composite scores and earnings
speak to the importance of academic achievement and early
career planning in the future of our workforce. Not only do
college readiness and career planning directly affect
success in postsecondary education, they also predict longterm salary attainment (Tracey & Robbins, 2006).
When discussing accountability, the parents’
responsibility in educating their children is rarely
mentioned. The general public has seen, through media and
politicians, the comparative statistics showing the United
States trailing other nations in many categories. They see
superior test scores as the only factor by which to judge
schools and how schools should be held accountable. Focus
is often directed at schools, and blame is put on the
educational process, yet school officials usually do not
have the impact on a student that the parent will have
(Bippus, 2005). From birth until adulthood, children spend
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only 10 percent of the hours they are awake in the school
setting. The rest of the time is in the home environment
where parents may or may not be supportive of or involved
in the child’s education (Bippus, 2005). Some answers that
have been contemplated are charter schools, open
enrollment, voucher and privatization; with these
approaches forcing schools to do a better job of teaching
students. The role of parents in improving academic
performance is left out of these discussions totally.
Examples of ways parents can negatively affect student
achievement are to never read to their children or to not
get involved in their education by reviewing homework or
assignments. Often parents will not monitor the time or
content that children watch on television, or the amount of
sleep or nutrition they receive. Parents often hinder
educators by lying to school officials about attendance,
failing to attend parent-teacher conferences, refusing to
discuss the student’s progress, or even not teaching basic
manners or attaching consequences to misbehavior (Bippus,
2005). Common sense should tell us that parents who see it
as their responsibility to read to their children,
guarantee they eat and sleep enough, and supervise their
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educational progress ensure a better education for their
children. A child who is read to for at least 20 minutes a
day absorbs 600 hours of structured language. School
districts need to work with parents to open communications
and share expectations with all parents (Bippus, 2005).
In 1996, the governor of Oklahoma, Frank Keating,
proposed a nearly $11 million bonus-pay incentive program.
This incentive program rewarded teachers in the twenty
percent of schools that improved the most over a three year
period. Teachers in 360 schools received bonuses ranging
from $500 to $4,000. The largest bonus went to the teachers
with at least 15 years experience in the top 4 percent of
schools. The state used standardized test scores and
factors such as dropout rates to determine which schools
were most improved (Lawton, 1996).
Diversifying the way teachers are paid is gaining
support as a possible way to increase accountability and
improve student achievement. Some states are experimenting
with a variety of pay systems that base salary on knowledge
skills or performance of schools or teachers. The process
for moving away from a salary schedule based solely on
degrees and experience is a difficult one. As more attempts
are made to devise new methods of compensating teachers,

Teacher Compensation

49

educators are learning more about what it takes for such a
plan to succeed. Several educational studies confirm the
long-held belief that teacher quality is one of the utmost
factors of student achievement (Azordegan, et al., 2005).
As a result, legislators have given considerable attention
to methods for improving teacher quality and teacher
compensation. It is generally assumed that teachers earn
smaller salaries than comparably educated workers in other
occupations. Many proponents argue that uniform increases
in teacher salaries will improve both the recruitment and
retention of highly skilled teachers thus raising overall
teacher quality. Some studies find higher salaries lead to
improved teacher quality and student achievement, but
others find unilateral salary increases have little effect
on student performance and teacher retention (Azordegan, et
al., 2005).
Teachers have been compensated based on a single
salary schedule using lanes and steps for over 75 years.
They advance in pay based on years of experience and
education attained. Statistics show the relationship
between teacher quality and years of teaching experience is
minuscule or non-existent after a teacher’s first five years
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(Azordegan, et al., 2005). In addition, some research
indicates it may be negatively affected after 20 years of
teaching. During the 1980’s and 1990s, most redesigned
teacher payment systems were either merit pay or career
ladder systems. Merit pay plans tended to rely on
subjective evaluations of teachers to determine some
percentage of salary and were, in most cases, poorly
designed. Educators reported dissatisfaction with the
programs, believing they presented faulty evaluation and no
clear direction toward improvement for teachers who ranked
at the bottom. Districts utilizing career ladder programs
exhibited some improvement in student achievement only
after several years of existence. Many of those career
ladder programs were not funded long enough to determine
student achievement gains (Azordegan, et al., 2005).
Those who criticize the familiar teacher salary
schedule with lanes and steps argue that it does not reward
good teaching as fairly as other pay systems in which
teachers are rewarded for obtaining special skills.
Supporters of the traditional systems claim that experience
and education are important predictors of how a teacher
will perform (Glazerman & Silva, 2006). School leaders have
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attempted to mesh the two systems. Selecting an alternative
is extremely difficult due to the lack of scientific
research on whether it impacts student performance. Several
schools across the nation have tried various teacher pay
systems and it has proven to be a formidable challenge.
There has been lengthy discussion about whether teacher pay
incentives improve the quality of the teacher or if the
incentives help recruit a higher quality individual into
the teaching field (Glazerman & Silva, 2006). In 2006,
Mathematica Policy Research Company conducted a study on
teacher pay feasibility. They broke the study into three
main areas: pay for performance, pay for knowledge and
skills, and pay for filling a need. The pay for performance
section focused on plans that rewarded teachers for
increased student achievement scores. The pay for knowledge
and skill section focused on plans that rewarded teachers
who demonstrated a special skill or took on additional
responsibilities. The pay for filling a need category
focused on plans that used incentive pay for teachers who
taught in a needed area such as high poverty or hard-tofill areas such as math and science (Glazerman & Silva,
2006).
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Some schools have experimented with using a
compensation system that focuses on student performance.
They reward either the individual teacher or entire school
with monetary rewards. Those who oppose individual-based
performance awards disagree that current testing systems do
not precisely assess improvement made by students.
Proponents for individual-based awards contend that when
carefully integrated into a refined measure of teacher
quality, student achievement test scores can provide an
autonomous measure for teacher performance (Azordegan, et
al., 2005). District-wide awards offer greater appeal to
some by encouraging collaboration instead of
competitiveness. Research found that teachers in
performance-award systems show signs of greater motivation
toward improved student performance, and the district shows
higher retention rate of highly qualified teachers
(Azordegan, et al., 2005).
In spite of the potential of these systems for
improved compensation, there is considerable resistance to
change. Critics argue that performance-award systems may
promote higher test scores, but if the tests are not
aligned properly, such improvement may not correlate to
actual learning. Teacher groups such as the National
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Education Association (NEA) often oppose these pay systems
based on the effectiveness of the evaluation process and
the teacher’s abilities to meet continually higher standards
for student performance. The strong teacher union presence
makes it difficult for legislators and educators to change
the existing single-salary pay schedule. Evaluation systems
based only on student test scores are sometimes criticized
as holding teachers accountable for factors outside of
their control. Schools that utilize evaluation systems
based on the teacher’s performance rather than student
performance are often criticized as subjective (Azordegan,
et al., 2005).
Successful programs for teacher compensation are ones
in which diversity is used. A range of evaluation
techniques are utilized such as evaluating teacher skill
and knowledge, principal reviews, peer reviews as well as
student achievement increases. The success of these systems
hinges on teacher support. When teachers are involved in
the planning and implementation of the compensation
systems, they tend to be more readily accepted. Teacher
unions generally support an idea if it is teacher led
(Odden, 1997). Developing a system in which teachers are
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paid based on student achievement should be a collaborative
effort. Teachers, administrators, parents, and policymakers
all have a vested interest and should be involved in the
process.
Compensation plans that rely on student performance
should be easy to understand. Teachers should be given the
training necessary to increase the students’ chance for
success and improved test scores. New compensation plans
take time to be implemented, and community members should
be patient. Improvements in teacher quality and student
achievement will take time. The design of a pay-forperformance system should be cognizant of the needs of
students and teachers. The history of how teachers have
been paid is ingrained in American society, and change is
difficult to implement. Any reform to the single salary
schedule is often a modification to the existing system
rather than a whole-hearted change (Azordegan, et al.,
2005).
As recently as 2005, there were 14 states that
proposed reforming the traditional teacher salary schedule.
Iowa proposed individual performance awards based on
student achievement. Alabama provided incentives for
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teachers to teach in poverty areas and rewarded teachers
for completing the National Board Certification. Rhode
Island funded a program in which schools implemented a new
salary system other than the existing single-salary
schedule (Azordegan, et al., 2005).
The state of Minnesota enacted an alternative pay
system called Quality Compensation in July 2005. The state
allocated $86 million statewide for the program and
established guidelines for schools (Azordegan, et al.,
2005). The guidelines called for establishing multiple
career paths, objective evaluation systems and professional
development that aligned with performance pay. Schools that
agreed to enact a salary schedule that was not the
conventional single-salary schedule were eligible for the
increased funding. Teachers and teacher unions have praised
the new system for student increases and incentive pay
(Azordegan, et al., 2005).
During the 1998-1999 school year, Vaughn Elementary
school in Los Angeles, California, implemented a skillbased pay system. The compensation system was designed to
address inequity in teacher pay, promote teacher retention,
increase salaries of teachers with longevity, and link
teacher pay to student performance (Azordegan, et al.,
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2005). The majority of students at Vaughn were on the free
and reduced lunch program and many were English Language
Learners (ELL). The base salary for teachers at Vaughn was
determined by certification and years of experience. Those
teachers who were Nationally Board Certified earned an
additional $4,000, and those who had a master’s degree
earned an additional $2,000. The additional money teachers
earned at Vaughn was based on performance. The performance
was teacher performance, not student performance. Teachers
received additional salary based on a 3 tier system. Level
I equated up to $5,550; Level II equated to $5,500 and
Level III was $2,000. The total performance pay amount
possibility was $13,050 (Azordegan, et al., 2005).
The Cincinnati, Ohio public school system implemented
a pay-for-performance system in 2003. The plan measured
teachers’ performance with a set of standards. The thought
process included a second stage in which teachers would be
compensated for student performance gains. The plan also
included a provision in which teachers could earn
additional incentive pay if they obtained advanced degrees
or certification (Glazerman & Silva, 2006). They retained
the current single-salary schedule and added these
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incentive pay programs to coexist with the original plan.
The new plan was called the Teacher Evaluation System (TES)
and teachers could move through five categories:
Apprentice, Novice, Career, Advanced and Accomplished.
Teachers had to move to a subsequent category annually in
order to be rehired for the following school year. Teachers
who were at the Advanced or Accomplished stage received
stipends ranging from $3,000 - $6,500. The stipend was paid
based on the teacher becoming a lead teacher, serving on a
curriculum committee, or mentoring a new teacher
(Azordegan, et al., 2005).
Cincinnati, Ohio, implemented a compensation system
that tied teacher pay to levels of teacher mastery and
performance as measured by classroom observations and
portfolio reviews. Cincinnati replaced the traditional
teacher salary schedule of lanes and steps with a system
that tied in teacher evaluations based on certain criteria
(Glazerman & Silva, 2006). The criteria included preparing
for student learning, creating a positive environment for
learning, teaching for learning, and professionalism. Teams
of educators reviewed the teacher portfolios of lesson
plans and observed the teacher teaching lessons. Ratings
provided the teacher with guidance and feedback. Teachers
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were then placed in categories which determined their
salary. Cincinnati did away with the traditional teacher
salary schedule and paid teachers based on their movements
up or down the ladder. Advancement in salary was not
automatic. Teachers were reviewed and evaluated every two
to five years. These reviews were noteworthy as they
determined the instructor’s salary. Student test scores were
not part of the evaluation process. The evaluation team was
made up of a lead teacher and a principal. The reviews were
comprised of portfolio reviews and classroom observations.
The portfolios included lesson plans, student work,
statistics on teacher attendance, as well as professional
development activities. Teachers went through a
comprehensive review every few years. New teachers were
classified as Apprentice teachers. Apprentice teachers
advanced to Novice teacher status by the end of their
second year. Novice teachers had to pass the PRAXIS III
exam and attain promotion to Career ranking by the end of
their fifth year as a Novice or else be terminated.
Teachers moved up or down the ladder. Teachers who dropped
levels received a cut in salary (Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
Cincinnati also introduced a “Lead Teacher” program in which

Teacher Compensation

59

teachers mentored other teachers and received an annual
$5,000 to $6,000 stipend for mentoring a fellow teacher.
Cincinnati’s pay system was touted as a positive example
that relied on strict evaluations that included student
performance, but also addressed various other components of
quality teaching (Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
Researchers have noted that to improve student
achievement, teachers need to increase their skills. In
order to motivate teachers to attain new skills educators
must adopt a skill-based pay system. The system implemented
needs to reward teacher knowledge and skills that
contribute to student learning (Gallagher, 2002). Reports
exist that show student performance is often impacted more
by poverty and the communities’ perception of education than
by the teachers themselves. Parents’ education does impact
a student’s education on some levels, but the impact of a
highly-qualified teacher is notable as well. Based on the
fact that teacher quality is important for student
learning, skills-based pay seeks to provide incentives for
teachers to improve their instructional skills. Skillsbased pay can improve student performance if teacher
knowledge and skills are focused in key areas, if teachers
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are evaluated in those areas, and if the teachers are
motivated to gain the skills (Gallagher, 2002). A wellqualified and highly-trained teacher is the most important
component in contributing to increasing student
performance. Teachers need to be properly trained, know
their subject matter, and be held responsible for student
growth. Experienced teachers can meet the NCLB mandate of
being highly qualified by taking an exam or by scoring high
on the state’s standard evaluation tool. In order to produce
an increased pool of highly-qualified teachers, the
requirements and planning must improve. The government
needs to provide school districts with incentives to
increase compensation packages for teachers. Beginning
teachers need to have the correct support system in place
to increase the odds for success. Teachers need the option
of increasing their salary through performing additional
responsibilities. NCLB should require targeted professional
development and training to core area teachers. Teacher
skills need to improve, and with the quick advances in
technology, teachers need to be kept up to speed with those
advances (American Federation of Teachers, 2005).
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More money is needed to ensure that all students have
a well-qualified teacher. Evidence exists that employing
highly-qualified teachers to work in poverty stricken
schools depends upon improving school facilities, providing
modern and updated textbooks, hiring qualified
administrators, and furnishing appropriate professional
development (American Federation of Teachers, 2005).
NCLB has increased apprehension about the employment
difficulties faced by schools that serve a high number of
low-performing students. NCLB mandated each student be
taught in all core subjects by a highly-qualified teacher
by the 2005-2006 school year. The law defined a highlyqualified teacher as one who has received a bachelor’s
degree, is fully certified, and has proven that they know
the subject they teach. As of June 2006, there was not one
school district nation-wide that had met this goal. School
districts were required to submit a plan to their
respective state as to how they would ensure all classrooms
had a highly-qualified teacher. States also had to show
that these teachers were divided equally between rich and
poor schools (Wheeler, 2007).
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Iowa adopted a plan in 2001 to improve teacher quality
and student performance. The plan addressed the issue of
rural and urban teacher shortages as well as the disparity
of teacher salaries compared to neighboring states. A
beginning teacher must have successfully completed a
preparation program and hold at least a provisional
teaching certificate (Azordegan, et al., 2005). In order to
move to the next level, the beginning teacher must have
completed the two-year program and received a satisfactory
evaluation. School districts were required to raise the
minimum salary for a first year teacher by at least $1,500
per year. After successfully completing the Beginning
Teacher program, the teacher began work on a professional
development plan. Iowa required that schools create at
least a $2,000 difference between a Beginning Teacher and a
Career Teacher. Iowa also created the Variable Pay Pilot in
2001 in which schools created a team-based pay plan. The
plans involved student performance goals and multiple
indicators to determine progress. If the goals were met,
all certified staff members at that school received cash
bonuses (Azordegan, et al., 2005).
Teacher quality makes a difference in how students
perform in the classroom. There has been increased public
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pressure for schools to ensure students are learning at a
high level. NCLB mandates proficiency by the year 2014 and
thus schools across the nation are focused on improving
student achievement. Administrators and educators desire to
know how best to train, develop, evaluate, and compensate
teachers to obtain the desired results. There is increasing
debate over what defines teacher quality. Teachers advocate
that teaching is a profession that requires significant
preparation and rigorous licensing. This thought process
expects teachers to have curriculum knowledge, teaching
skill, and assessment knowledge. Opposing views hold that
teaching is a duty that most intelligent people can perform
and that the skills necessary for success can be learned on
the job. This line of thought believes that alternative
routes to teaching certificates should be allowed
(Corcoran, 2007).
Each state sets its own guidelines for teacher
certification. During the last 10 years, testing potential
teachers has become increasingly popular. In 2005, 48
states required teachers to pass at least one test in order
to be certified to teach (Corcoran, 2007). Many states use
the nationally renowned Educational Testing Services (ETS)
to test teachers. The American Board for Certification of
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Teacher Excellence (ABCTE) is developing a test that
provides a common standard should the state adopt it. This
test makes teaching licenses transferable from one state to
another. One of the advantages to licensing is that it
takes the pressure off of local school boards during the
hiring stage. If a teacher is not licensed, they are not
eligible for the job position. Opponents argue that teacher
licensure does not guarantee high teacher quality. If
standards are raised for teachers, there will be a cost
factor. Candidates will be harder to find and the
likelihood of hiring a highly qualified person will
diminish (Corcoran, 2007).
Many states advocate developing and financially
supporting teacher induction programs. These support
systems provide guidance and sustainability as teachers
transition into the classroom. The hope is that these
beginning teachers will have the support system in place to
become successful at a quicker pace. The induction model
includes mentors, additional training, and feedback on
performance. There are issues such as teacher turnover that
impact the bottom line. States could potentially save
thousands of dollars if there is better teacher retention.
Supporters of teacher induction programs believe if quality
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teacher support groups were formed and funded the state
could save money by reducing teacher turnover. A research
study in Texas found that the state’s annual 15.5% teacher
turnover rate costs a minimum of $330 million per year
(Corcoran, 2007).
Discussion about how teachers are paid is gaining
political attention. Research is clear that neither
educational credits, degrees, nor years of experience are
linked to student achievement gains (Odden, 2000).
Kentucky, Colorado, and Minnesota have tried school level
performance rewards. Several have experimented with
providing salary increases for teachers who earn national
certification. Some states have offered a form of career
ladder stipends. To date, very few have successfully
implemented paying teachers for student performance (Odden,
2000). Teacher unions are committed to keeping the singlesalary teacher pay schedule in spite of the indication of
inequality. Schools have offered signing bonuses, loan
forgiveness, housing assistance, moving expenses, and
tuition reimbursement to attract teachers in mathematics,
science, special education, etc., but have not altered the
single-salary schedule. Proponents for the individual
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teacher rewards maintain that gains on student performance
tests can provide an independent measure for teacher
performance (Corcoran, 2007).
It is often assumed that public school teachers are
poorly paid. Seldom do you read about how teacher pay
compares to other occupations. In a recent U.S. Bureau of
Statistics survey, some comparisons were reported. The
survey included 66 metropolitan areas and compared the
hourly pay of teachers. According to the survey, the
average teacher in the United States earned $34.06 per
hour, and worked an average of 36.5 hours per week in 2005.
By comparison, white-collar workers worked 39.4 hours per
week (Greene & Winters, 2007). Compared with public school
teachers, reporters earned 24% less; architects, 11% less;
psychologists, 9% less, and mechanical engineers, 6% less.
On the other extreme, airplane pilots earned 186% more;
doctors, 80% more; lawyers, 49% more. The National
Education Association claims it is easier to earn more
money in other fields and that teachers are under paid.
Public school teachers earn 86% more than the average white
collar worker in Elkhart, Indiana. After the U. S. Bureau’s
survey was released, some argued that the salary
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comparisons did not include the extra time teachers spend
grading papers, preparing lesson plans, etc. The survey
included all of these extra activities in the calculations.
School teachers reported taking work home on a consistent
basis, but so did the other professionals who were
surveyed. Thirty percent or more of the workers in
management and professional occupations reported working at
home during the May 2004 survey period (Greene & Winters,
2007).
An additional study was performed recently where
comparisons were made between metro areas in which teacher
pay was higher, and outlying areas where the teachers were
paid less. The metro area’s graduation rate was not
significantly higher than the outlying group. Increased
spending and student-teacher ratio had no effect on high
school graduation rates either (Greene & Winters, 2007).
These results suggest that increasing the pay of teachers
does not increase student achievement. Teacher groups are
avid about increasing teacher pay. Often times the concept
of working long hours for inadequate pay is cited. The
level of teacher pay is greatly fashioned by whatever the
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political process decides it should be (Greene & Winters,
2007).
School districts with smaller student-to-teacher
ratios have a greater opportunity to positively impact
student performance due to having a better relationship
with their students. By living in a smaller community, the
teachers have a greater opportunity to know the parents
better than teachers do in a larger district. Melnick
claims that school size is not the determining factor in
the quality of a child’s elementary school education. He
believed that factors such as the leadership of the
principal, dedication of the staff, and community support
are also important factors. There is also a greater
opportunity for students in small schools to hold positions
of authority and leadership thus preparing them for
leadership once they exit high school (Melnick, 1986).
Rural schools struggle to find enough teachers to
support student enrollment. Many times the candidate pool
is small or non-existent. Teacher salary is often cited as
the main issue in recruiting and retaining teachers, but
health insurance and benefits also play an important role.
As health insurance premiums increase, school districts are
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forced to choose between covering the cost of the teacher’s
health insurance and spending those dollars on other
educational needs. In the 2008 legislative report regarding
the state of Idaho, researchers found the supply of
certificated instructors was not adequate. The number of
college students entering the teaching field was down while
the number of Idaho college graduates leaving the state to
teach in neighboring states had increased. Idaho struggled
to match neighboring states teacher salary levels (Idaho,
2008).
The Douglas County Pay for Performance Plan received
attention because of its longevity. Douglas County is
located in Colorado. The system rewards teachers annually
for years of satisfactory experience. The pay plan has been
in place since 1994 (Glazerman & Silva, 2006). A feature of
the plan is that teachers must earn a satisfactory rating
on their summative evaluation in order to receive the
salary increase. Educators also may receive several bonuses
each year such as a onetime payment of $1,250 for the
Outstanding Teacher bonus and $12,500 over five years for
the Master Teacher bonus. The Outstanding Teacher bonus is
given based on a portfolio submission. Teachers who earn
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the Master Teacher bonus must demonstrate student growth,
professional leadership, and professional recognition
(Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
Benwood Initiative is a teacher incentive plan in
Chattanooga, Tennessee, which began in 2002 to improve
student achievement in the area of reading (Glazerman &
Silva, 2006). The program targeted nine low-performing
schools. The plan aimed to recruit and retain highly
qualified teachers by offering cash bonuses and various
other benefits. These incentives were based on improved
student achievement scores. The thought process was that if
teachers saw an increase in pay as a goal, they would, in
turn, work harder to ensure their students performed well
on state exams. The program also included money that was
spent on professional development, materials, additional
staff, and after school programs for students. The
individual teacher incentives included $5,000 bonuses for
high scores from the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment
System (TVAAS) and teachers were eligible for free
enrollment in the Master’s program in education at the
University of Tennessee. School-wide teams earned $1,000 or
$2,000 based on the students’ three-year gains (Glazerman &
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Silva, 2006). The team bonuses were awarded to principals,
assistant principals, special subject teachers, and
librarians as well as the classroom teacher. The principals
also earned $10,000 if their school received the team
bonus. Beginning in the 2004-2005 school year, assistant
principals could earn an additional bonus of $5,000 if
their school team met its goal. In order to increase
retention, the teachers had to return to Benwood the
following school year to receive their bonus. Teachers at
Benwood were also eligible for financial help in buying a
home in downtown Chattanooga. Educators could receive a
loan of up to $10,0000 for a down payment which was
forgiven if they lived in the home for a minimum of five
years (Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
Charlotte, North Carolina’s Mecklenburg school has a
pay-for-performance program that focuses on improving
student achievement in low-performing schools by rewarding
staff based on their attendance, professional development,
and student achievement (Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
Employees are paid bonuses if their school meets its goals.
Teachers were paid bonuses if their students’ test scores
improved. The tests included the North Carolina End of
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Grade or End of Course tests as well as local school
district exams. During the first year of implementation,
the bonus focused on student achievement. Teachers who
volunteered for the program were given student achievement
goals. Teachers could also earn additional bonuses based on
their attendance and professional development. Attendance
bonuses were given if a teacher missed four or fewer days
per school year and attended at least thirty hours of
professional development. Classroom teachers who met the
student achievement goal were awarded $1,400 bonuses and
teachers who met their attendance goal earned an additional
$600. During the first year of the program, approximately
25% of the teachers earned bonuses (Glazerman & Silva,
2006).
The state of California implemented an incentive
program that focused on improving standardized test scores.
It provided cash bonuses to all certified staff that showed
student academic growth from one year to the next. The cash
bonuses were as high as $25,000. Each bonus was linked to
student test scores (Glazerman & Silva, 2006). The program
was in place for one year only and then cut due to
budgetary reasons. For California schools to participate in
the reward system, their students had to be in the lower
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half of the baseline score data and the school had to have
shown improvement in the prior year’s test scores. The
California Education Department ranked all qualified school
districts based on their test growth. They then considered
the number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) staff at each
school. For schools who had 1,000 FTEs, each certified
staff member received $25,000; schools that encompassed the
next 3,500 FTEs received $10,000 per person; schools
encompassing the next 7,500 FTEs received $5,000 per person
(Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
Career Ladder
Missouri’s Career Ladder program was established in
1985. The goal of the program was to improve student
performance by offering teachers opportunities for extra
pay for extra work and professional development. Teachers
who meet statewide and district-level performance criteria
received additional pay. The Career Ladder program does not
replace the salary schedule but offers additional pay for
teachers who elect to participate. The Career Ladder has
three stages which are based on a teacher’s years of
experience. To advance on the ladder, teachers are
evaluated at each level and must submit documentation that
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they have completed a set of established goals (MDESE,
2008). Stage I participants earn $1,500; Stage II
participants earn $3,000; Stage III participants earn
$5,000.
Other states have attempted Career Ladder programs,
but Missouri’s is the longest running program of its kind.
Missouri’s Career Ladder has components that include teacher
performance, tenure, and extra responsibilities. The cash
bonuses are awarded based on duties and extra
responsibilities the teacher takes on outside of their
teacher contract time (MDESE, 2008). School districts
choose whether they want to participate or not. Missouri’s
Career Ladder program is a matching funds program.
Districts must match part of the cash award. Percentages
are based on a school’s poverty rate. The state covers 40,
50 or 60 percent of the cost depending on the school’s
poverty rating. Some schools elect not to participate due
to the cost of their portion of the program. Teachers are
eligible to participate if they are full time employees,
have the appropriate certification, and formally enroll in
the program (MDESE, 2008). Participants must develop a
Career Ladder Plan and have it approved locally by an
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elected group of educators and an administrator. Teachers
are expected to demonstrate evidence of performance at or
above the expected level on 20 criteria on the school’s
Performance Based Teacher Evaluation (PBTE). The criteria
can include engaging students, assessing students, showing
content knowledge, professionalism in the school,
participating in professional development, and adherence to
the district’s mission. To qualify for Stage I, a teacher
must have five years of teaching experience in Missouri. To
qualify for Stage II, the teacher must have completed two
years on Stage I. To qualify for Stage III, the teacher
must have completed three years of service on Stage II.
Stage I participants must spend a total of 60 hours or more
on at least two different responsibilities. Stage II
participants must spend a total of 90 hours or more on at
least three different responsibilities. Stage III
participants must spend a total of 120 hours or more on at
least four different responsibilities. Missouri’s Career
Ladder Program was in response to the report A Nation at
Risk in 1983 (Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
Arkansas offers a bonus program for teachers who teach
in small, rural schools. The program is statewide, but
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focuses on schools with enrollments of 1,000 or less and
that have over 80% free and reduced lunch rates. Educators
in Arkansas receive bonus pay for working in a high need
district. The cash bonuses are awarded for agreeing to
teach in one of these school districts. The bonus also
applies to returning teachers. Student performance has no
bearing on the cash bonus. New teachers to the district
receive a signing bonus of $4,000 and a retention bonus of
$3,000 per year for each of the following two years.
Teachers already in the district when the program was
instituted received a bonus of $2,000 per year for up to
three years (Glazerman & Silva, 2006).
In 2001, North Carolina passed legislation that
dictated if a student did not pass the 10th grade basic
competency test he or she would not graduate from high
school. The test was given in grade 10 and in subsequent
years until the student passed (Public School Forum, 1999).
With the prospect of several thousand students not passing
the test and not graduating from high school, North
Carolina educators took a long, hard look at how they spent
educational dollars. Educators asked themselves about the
proper balance between academics and preparing students for
the world of work. They questioned what a person should
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know once they earn a North Carolina diploma. Paul Ensley’s
study found that good teaching matters and that teaching
salaries should be differentiated based on supply and
demand. He also believed that teachers teaching in critical
shortage areas such as math, science, foreign language, and
special education should be compensated accordingly. North
Carolina created two model high schools and recognized that
money mattered. The North Carolina School of Science and
Mathematics and the North Carolina School of the Arts have
become models for states across the nation. Annually the
Mathematics and Science school is one of the nation’s top
three performers in the science area. Per pupil
expenditures at both schools are high. North Carolina found
that money did make a difference. Money meant smaller class
sizes and classrooms with technology. Money also translated
into recruiting more highly qualified teachers. Teachers in
87% of the state’s lowest performing schools went from being
low performers to receiving $1,500 bonuses from the state
because they met expected goals in one year’s time (Public
School Forum).
Kentucky instituted an accountability program entitled
the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System
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(KIRIS) in the 1990s. The assessment is linked to the
Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) goals. The program
requires schools to show levels of improvement on
performance-based assessment or face sanctions that could
result in dismissal of teachers. Teachers whose students
show improvement are eligible to receive financial awards.
There are two high stakes tests used in Kentucky. One is an
exam that is used for a student’s promotion or graduation.
The other test is used as a reflection of instructional
quality. Opponents of the system argue that the system may
encourage poor test takers to drop out of school or cause
them to be placed in special education classes. Critics
also claim that administrators move the best teachers to
accountable grade levels. Some fear teachers will want to
transfer to schools that have a better chance of doing well
on the exams (Kannapel, 1996).
Educators continue to explore ways to hold schools and
teachers accountable. High stakes testing seems to be here
for the long haul. Some studies in recent years have shown
positive outcomes from performance-based testing.
Legislators in Kentucky mandated the development of a
performance-based assessment program to hold schools
accountable for student achievement (Kannapel, 1996).
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Students in grades 4, 5, 8, 11, and 12 are tested annually
with an assessment instrument that includes written
portfolios, multiple-choice and open response questions, as
well as performance events. Schools that show improvement
of at least one percent and move at least ten percent of
their students to a higher level receive cash rewards which
are divided according to the desires of the majority of
teachers at the school. Schools that do not meet the
minimum standards are subject to sanctions. Schools are
evaluated every two years. The 1992-1994 test scores
resulted in $2,602 bonuses for each teacher. One third of
Kentucky’s public schools received some sort of cash bonus
(Kannapel, 1996).
Kentucky’s desire to increase student performance was
met with a fair amount of criticism. In a 1994 survey, 85%
of the 70 educators surveyed stated they did not believe
that all students could achieve at a high level. Some
commented that the student’s home life and lack of
motivation kept them from performing at high levels.
Opponents of Kentucky’s pay system felt the focus should be
on the students and not on teachers (Kannapel, 1996).
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A study in Connecticut concerning school size and
quality of education was conducted in the late 1980’s. The
study concluded that there was no significant difference
between large and small schools in relation to expenditure
per pupil. The study did indicate that smaller schools did
pay higher educational tax rates (Melnick, 1986).
Connecticut had experienced a reduction in high school
class enrollments statewide and was considering
consolidation of some schools. Those that supported
consolidation claimed that students benefited from larger
schools due to a more varied curriculum, better facilities,
extracurricular activities, etc. The proponents of smaller
schools claimed students benefited from not having to
change buildings so often and that remaining housed in a
central location benefited them academically. They also
touted that attending a small school meant closer
relationships with teachers and families. They claimed the
time spent riding a bus would be detrimental. They also
admonished that students had a greater opportunity to
participate in extracurricular activities due to smaller
enrollment populations (Melnick, 1986).
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Our nation is fixated with individual accountability.
It seems that more than any other country in the world
America likes to reward and punish individuals. The problem
with teacher compensation systems is the difficulty of
evaluating and rewarding individuals. Most of the pay for
performance systems focuses on test scores and not on
teaching. Test scores are more prone to corruption than
instructional practices. The potential for cheating on
state exams has never been higher than it is today.
Educators are under stress to perform and perhaps would be
willing to be dishonest to obtain the necessary goals.
Performance pay is not sufficient. The system has to be
supported by strong professional development (Shanker,
2006).
There are teacher pay systems that reward knowledge
and skills. Some pay plans reward additional certifications
or National Board Certification. There are a few teacher
pay plans that recognize mastery of a technology skill,
leadership components and teacher performance when measured
by standards-based evaluation. There is a competency model
entitled the Framework for Teaching that applies to all
grade levels. The Framework describes teacher performance
from beginner to experienced. The four performance domains
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are planning and preparation, classroom environment,
instruction, and professional responsibilities. The
Framework for Teaching may be used as an instrument for
standards-based evaluation. Herbert Heneman believed that
teachers need to prove competency before advancing in
salary. It is important to develop rubrics, prepare
teachers and principals methodically, train evaluators
effectively, and support teachers in gaining knowledge and
skills (Heneman, 2006).
Dropout rates have declined in the past 20 years and
college attendance has been on the rise. High school
students are taking more advanced coursework than ever
before, and yet our student achievement level has remained
flat (Fordham, 1998). It appears elementary students
through grades 5 or 6 show an annual increase, but
somewhere in middle school and high school they plateau. It
seems in America the longer a child stays in school, the
farther behind he falls. Business owners claim finding
quality personnel is more difficult than ever and that they
have to train and retrain individuals on simple
technological skills. There exists a wide disparity between
good schools and bad schools across our nation. Where a
child lives determines what kind of education he receives.
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The United States is at a crossroads educationally. The
decision to educate all students or simply keep them in
school until they reach a certain age has become a dilemma.
Thousands of poor and minority children are stuck with the
school district in which they reside. Many times these
schools have the least qualified teachers and the poorest
facilities. Even if their parents wanted to do something
different for their children they lack the ability to see
that it occurs (Fordham, 1998).
Principals should be held accountable for teachers who
are not performing. Principals should have the authority to
hire and fire teachers. If the teachers’ students are not
showing improvement, the teacher should not be retained. If
the school fails, the principal should not be retained. It
is our responsibility to ensure students have the
opportunity to be successful. Educators must equip them
with the necessary skills to live a prosperous and
responsible life. Once they graduate from high school, they
should be ready to enter the work force (Fordham, 1998).
In the 1980s, the Kansas City Missouri School District
was told by a federal judge to develop a plan to improve
the education of black students and encourage
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desegregation. The judge told the Kansas City District that
he would find the money to pay for their plan. Kansas City
spent $11,700 per pupil which bought higher teacher
salaries, 15 new schools, an Olympic swimming pool,
television studio, field trips to Mexico, etc. The student
teacher ratio was 13 to 1 which was the lowest of any major
school in the United States (Ciotti, 1998).
Even with all of the money spent in the Kansas City
School District, the results were less than desirable.
Student achievement did not improve and the black versus
white gap ratios did not shrink. There was less integration
than before the judge’s court order. This experiment with
expenditures suggested that educational problems cannot be
solved with money alone (Ciotti, 1998).
The judge told the Kansas City School District in 1985
to spend nearly $2 billion over the next dozen years to
build new schools, integrate schools, and bring student
test scores up. During this time span, the number of blacks
attending black schools increased instead of decreased and
student test performance did not improve. The Kansas City
example was a major humiliation to supporters of increased
funding for schools (Ciotti, 1998).
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The judge had focused so much attention on
desegregation he lost sight of the students’ lack of
achievement. Opponents wanted the judge to address the
achievement issue more than the integration issue. The
judge had done what a lot of educators thought he should do
to improve student performance such as reduce class size,
decrease teacher workloads, increase teacher pay, and
radically increase per pupil expenditures. The school
district still failed. In retrospect, some thought the
Kansas City School District should have implemented merit
pay, incentive pay, vouchers, rewards for effective
teachers, and penalties for ineffective teachers (Ciotti,
1998).
Vaughn Elementary School in Los Angeles, California,
is a school that utilizes knowledge and skills-based pay.
Vaughn is a charter school that educates approximately
1,200 students. Vaughn is 100% Title I and has a 100% free
and reduced lunch rate. Prior to getting a charter in 1983,
Vaughn had extremely low student test scores. Student
achievement has greatly improved and the school has been
recognized as a Blue Ribbon School in recent years
(Gallagher, 2002).
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In 1998, Vaughn began implementing a skills-based pay
plan. Teachers were evaluated during three week-long
windows throughout the school year on lesson plans,
classroom management, literacy, mathematics, language
development, special education inclusion, social studies,
science, art, and technology. Teachers were given a score
in the range of 1 to 4 on each standard (Gallagher, 2002).
In the early 1990s, the Tennessee legislature adopted
a plan to track elementary teachers’ performance yearly.
Tennessee lawmakers touted the plan as one based not on
traditional indicators such as training and experience, but
on student performance. Tennessee compared the importance
of teacher effectiveness with other variables such as class
size, free and reduced lunch students, etc. They also
compared urban and rural schools. The research indicated
that teacher effectiveness was 20 times as significant as
these other factors (Dawson & Billingsley, 2000).
In the early 2000s, the Los Angeles Unified School
District (LAUSD) offered a uniform salary increase of six
percent for teachers. In addition to this raise teachers
whose students had an increase on their Stanford-9 scores
received bonus pay. Some research indicates that teachers
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who have a strong academic background leave teaching within
a few years for more lucrative careers. There is little
evidence that higher uniform salary schedules increase
student performance. Salary does play a role in teacher
turnover but is only one of many variables. The average
annual rate of turnover nationwide is around 11 percent of
all workplace employees. Teacher turnover is only slightly
higher at 12 percent. Research in the state of California
indicated that teacher turnover rates had no significant
impact on student achievement (Dawson & Billingsley, 2000).
Teacher turnover is higher at the secondary level than
at the elementary level. United States Secretary of
Education Richard Riley forecasted in 2000 that public
schools were going to struggle to keep qualified teachers
in the classroom. It appears at the secondary level physics
and chemistry teachers have the highest rates of turnover.
Communication Arts and social studies teachers are more
secure. Statistics indicate teachers in math and science in
California leave the teaching field due to the rigor of
entry and the stagnant salary schedules that prevent them
from earning a higher salary (Dawson & Billingsley, 2000).
A 1998-1999 California study by the Center for the
Future of Teaching and Learning (CFTL) found that 40% of
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California’s new hires in 1998 were teachers who were
entering the teaching field for the second time. The CFTL
defined “under-qualified” as teachers who did not hold a
full certificate in their area of instruction. CFTL
reported that 1 in 10 classrooms were staffed by an
unqualified teacher. The research found that schools with
the highest free or reduced lunch program enrollment also
had the highest percentage of unqualified teachers. The
most significant statistic in the CFTL study was that
schools with the highest student achievement had the fewest
number of under-qualified teachers. Third grade reading
test scores were drastically higher in schools that had
teachers who were fully certified. The highest scoring
schools had only 4 percent of teachers who were
unqualified, while schools that scored lower had teachers
who were unqualified 22 percent of the time (Dawson &
Billingsley, 2000).
Teacher Certification
One other important factor in raising student
achievement has been identified as reducing class size. In
the 1990s, the Education Commission of the States
identified twenty-four states that have established
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guidelines, grants, or other financial assistance for
schools to lower class sizes (Kennedy, 2003). In 2002,
Florida voters approved a sweeping plan requiring the
states’ schools to set a ceiling on the number of students
in every classroom from kindergarten through high school.
The passage of this law also amended Florida’s constitution
relative to student class size. By the year 2010, class
size must not exceed 18 in kindergarten through third
grade, 22 in fourth through eighth grades, and 25 in high
school. Small class sizes allow teachers to give more
individual attention to students, manage their classrooms
more effectively, and create a more positive atmosphere for
teaching and learning (Kennedy, 2003). With smaller
classroom enrollment, teachers have an increased
opportunity to get to know their students on a more
personal level and more accurately learn the students’
strengths and weaknesses. Discipline problems should also
diminish with fewer students per classroom. The financial
burden of this new law will potentially cost the state of
Florida hundreds of thousands of dollars. It will mean more
school buildings and many more classroom teachers.
Opponents to Florida’s plan claim the price tag will be $27
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billon and that the state is already lacking qualified
teachers. They claim there will not be enough money to give
adequate raises to the existing teachers and administrators
if this plan remains a law. Studies on the effect of class
size, state that reducing class size is most effective when
class size range is between fifteen and nineteen. Schools
and students that benefit the most are low-income and lowachieving. It is also recommended that teachers with
reduced class sizes receive quality professional
development in order to offer a demanding curriculum to all
students (Kennedy, 2003).
The National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1998
found that teachers who had some type of certification made
a statistically significant impact on students’ math
performance compared to students with teachers who lacked
certification in the math field. It was estimated the
difference in certification amounted to three fourths of a
year of learning. The research also indicated students who
had instructors with math degrees outperformed those
students whose math teachers did not have a math degree
(Dawson & Billingsley, 2000).
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Research on whether providing alternative routes to
teacher certification is a positive has been inconclusive.
Proponents argue that alternative methods to teacher
certification provide a more diverse pool of candidates.
The question of teacher quality still remains when
alternative certification practices are used. Evidence
exists that teachers who earn certification by traditional
methods produce higher student test scores than those who
become teachers via alternate routes. The research shows
that the teachers who became certified via alternate routes
catch up by year three. There is increasing disagreement
about the best way to prepare teachers. Some argue that
reducing the requirements for entry into the teaching field
will attract strong candidates. Opponents feel reducing the
requirements will lessen teacher preparedness. The National
Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE)
and the Teacher Education Accreditation Council (TEAC) are
the two institutions that accredit teacher education
programs. Both of these groups desire college institutions
to gather data on their graduates (Corcoran, 2007).
Are teachers discouraged from entering the teaching
field due to the possibility of teaching in a low-income
region? Do potential teachers decide not to enter the
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teaching field due to the lengthy certification process or
is it the low salaries? Schools across the nation view
experienced teachers as competent and qualified when often
times this is not the case. When a teacher interviews and
has the appropriate certification it is difficult to select
another candidate over the certified one. Principals need
to make the ultimate decision on which teacher to hire and
then be held accountable for that teacher’s performance in
the classroom. If student performance does not improve, the
teacher should be held accountable.
In many parts of the United States, teachers are not
viewed as professionals. There is a belief that anyone with
a college degree can teach. Until teachers are treated with
respect and compensated accordingly, school districts will
continue to employ teachers who are inadequate due to the
lack of highly qualified teachers. Research has shown that
placing a highly competent teacher in front of a classroom
of students is the best way to improve student performance.
The single most important factor in whether or not students
will achieve at high levels is their teacher’s
qualifications (Jones, 1998).
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Nationwide, the education field has faced challenges
in attracting and retaining suitable, qualified teachers. A
high turnover ratio in education relates to low pay and
lack of high quality professional development. Teachers
leave the field in spite of their qualifications due to
economic restraints. Even though teachers and
administrators have a college degree, they still lack in
income comparisons with all workers nationwide. A reform
movement in California entitled Compensation and
Recognition Encourages Stability (CARES) emerged to address
the deficiencies in professional development for educators.
The CARES model works to promote teacher retention by
improving professional development. The movement also links
professional development with increased teacher pay
including incentive pay (Whitebook, 2005).
The CARES plan mandated 21 hours of professional
development per year. Participants would earn $500 - $6,000
rewards depending on their education and background. The
program did not raise base salaries but did provide
incentives through the professional development
opportunities. In 2000, the state of California made funds
available through a matching funds program in cooperation
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with CARES. In 2000 – 2001, 14 California counties
participated in this matching funds program. That number
increased to 41 counties in year number two and in 2004 the
total number of counties that participated had risen to 47.
The assumption of the CARES plan was that teachers would
improve instruction techniques, earn an increased salary,
and in turn student performance would increase. An added
goal would be workforce consistency. Reviews of the CARES
program indicate that the professional development
component was accomplished. Educators were motivated and
engaged (Whitebook, 2005).
It appears that bonus pay does influence teachers’
decisions to remain in the teaching field. Evidence
suggests that incentives could increase recruitment and
retention in high-need schools and in various subject
areas. Salary seems to be the main reason teachers leave
the teaching field. Over 30% of North Carolina science
teachers who had left the profession indicated they would
return to teaching if the salary was higher (Wheeler,
2007).
Some research indicates the need for more intensive
education of preschool age children. School age readiness
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tends to be lacking now more so than ever before. Students
entering kindergarten lack the fundamentals necessary for
success. Some states have discussed mandating preschool for
all children. Before that initiative becomes a reality the
financial aspects must be explored. The current preschool
teacher salaries across the United States lack in
comparison to the salaries of public school elementary
teachers. If preschool becomes mandatory nationwide, the
need for highly qualified preschool teachers will be an
issue due to the already declining number of highly
qualified K-12 public school teachers. Advocates of
preschool education claim that preschool teachers should be
paid the same as K-12 instructors. Opponents argue the
curriculum is not as demanding, and therefore the salaries
should not be comparable. Proponents of preschool education
claim that in order to attract highly qualified teachers
the salary must be comparable. Currently the qualifications
for preschool teachers do not compare to the qualifications
for an elementary school teacher. Some say a preschool
teacher would not require the same monetary benefits
because the preschool setting is a less challenging
environment; there are more adults per child than a public
school setting; the content and curriculum are not as
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challenging to teach; discipline is less due to the age of
the students; and there are fewer testing and student
performance issues with preschool age students (Bellm &
Whitebook, 2005).
The National School Board Association suggests that to
improve student performance you must start focusing on
reading and math early in a child’s education. They
emphasize using trained tutors and investing in highly
qualified teachers. Reducing class size is favorable and
setting annual achievement goals with appropriate
assessment tools is imperative. The importance of a quality
teacher is never more apparent than when a wide range of
kindergartners arrive for school. Some kindergarten
students arrive knowing how to identify letters and reading
while other kindergarten students have rarely heard an
adult read a book (Public School Forum, 1999).
Some recent research indicates that quality teaching
and caring for these younger students is critical for later
success in school. Advocates claim that teacher mastery of
a multitude of roles is necessary for these students to be
successful. A successful preschool teacher must not only
work well with the students, but also work well with the
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parents. Parents are more personally involved with
preschool teachers due to the age of the child. Proponents
argue that preschool age students are more vulnerable and
require acute attention and skill from the preschool
teacher. Preschool advocates cite the need for an
understanding of the student’s physical and emotional needs
at such a young age. The teacher must have a good
understanding of theory, knowledge, and teaching techniques
(Bellm & Whitebook, 2005).
Other factors that must be considered before
implementing comparable salaries for preschool teachers are
the professional development days, vacation and sick leave
days, and health insurance coverage. Benefit packages are
expensive and it is difficult to compete in the public
school arena when it comes to health insurance and
retirement plans. Many researchers have noted that the high
cost of collective preschool education is worth it when you
consider the lasting consequences of a failed generation of
youngsters. Georgia and Oklahoma both pay preschool
teachers the same as elementary school teachers (Bellm &
Whitebook, 2005).
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According to a 2003 Education Week’s Quality Survey,
the states of California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada,
and New York offered teachers a signing bonus in the 2003 –
2004 school year. Incentive programs vary from signing
bonuses to targeting high-need schools to targeting hardto-fill subject areas. California and Massachusetts also
offer bonus pay for teaching at a high-need school.
Massachusetts and New York pay bonuses for teaching in a
high-need subject area (Wheeler, 2007).
The majority of incentive pay plans provide bonuses to
retain experienced teachers or teachers identified as
highly-qualified. The survey stated that 35 states
participated in some sort of incentive pay program as of
2003. The state of Virginia was involved in an “Education
for a Lifetime” initiative which began in 2004. Two
counties in that state participated in that incentive pay
program. Arkansas began a program that same year that
included incentives to teach in distressed schools. In
2005, the United States House of Representatives
Appropriations subcommittee approved President Bush’s
“Teacher Incentive Fund”. This program would provide states
money to reward effective teachers as well as reward
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highly-qualified teachers that work in poverty areas
(Wheeler, 2007).
Evidence across the nation suggests incentive programs
focused on high-need schools and subject areas can be
beneficial in recruiting and retaining teachers. The school
district of Chattanooga, Tennessee used financial
incentives focusing on attracting better teachers in nine
low-performing elementary schools. Vacancies fell from 30
to two in one year. Third grade reading scores improved in
all nine elementary schools (Wheeler, 2007).
Orange County, North Carolina, offers a $1,500 bonus
for math, science, foreign language, and “reading recovery”
teachers who qualify as fully-certificated and highlyqualified under NCLB. They also offer monetary incentives
depending on tenure and experience. Orange County also pays
as much as $1,000 to teachers who teach in shortage areas
(Wheeler, 2007).
Charlotte, North Carolina, teachers who sign a
contract early in the spring receive a $1,000 signing bonus
and experienced teachers who teach in high-need areas
receive $1,500 to $2,000. Guilford County, North Carolina
began a program in 2006 in which special education and math
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teachers receive bonus pay. Certificated special education
teachers are paid one salary step above regular education
teachers. Math teachers who work in poverty areas receive
$9,000 and Algebra I teachers receive an additional
$10,000. If their students achieve at an increased level
they could earn an additional bonus of $2,500 - $4,000
(Wheeler, 2007).
NCLB mandates that all students are proficient by
2014. President George W. Bush knew his plan would cost
school districts additional money. It is disconcerting that
the government does not fully fund federal mandates. Title
I monies are specifically set aside to help schools meet
NCLB goals. However, to date Title I is not fully funded.
As recently as 2005 Title I was underfunded nation-wide by
over 9 billion dollars. The American Federation of Teachers
(AFT) suggests hiring reading and mathematics specialists
to provide teachers with research-based lessons and
training. AFT also supports smaller class sizes and
encourages NCLB to provide teachers with wireless internet
connections at school and home so they can tap into the
vast resources available on-line
Teachers, 2005).

(American Federation of
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There is evidence that students in the United States
lag behind other nations in several subject areas.
Proponents of school choice believe allowing parents to
choose which schools their child attends will help solve
this inadequacy problem. Our nation should: increase
academic standards, reject classroom methods that are
outdated, improve teacher content knowledge, provide other
methods for teacher certification, and increase pay for
classroom teachers (Fordham, 1998).
In recent years, private schools have been perceived
as being more successful in educating students than public
schools. Legislators have encouraged public schools to
imitate private schools in areas of reform. Some components
of private schools that are increasingly discussed among
public school opponents are school choice and smaller class
sizes. There are methodical differences involving public
and private schools. The matter of where students go to
school is one and another is the sources of support for
private schools. School choice is a hot topic currently as
is financial support for public education. Community
members want results from school districts across the
nation. Private schools depend upon tuition payments and
charitable donations to make ends meet, while public
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schools rely on federal, local and state governments to pay
the bills (Choy, 1997).
The gaps educationally between the haves and the have
nots are huge. Poor and disadvantaged children are left to
suffer the consequences of a poor school that will no doubt
impact their career choices. Students are passed from one
grade to the next, oftentimes without the ability to read.
Schools should not be one and the same. What works in one
part of the country might not work in another. Teachers and
administrators need the autonomy to experiment. Our country
is diverse; our educational system should be also. Our
public school system should be open to the public, paid for
by the public, and held accountable to the public.
Educators should demand excellence for our students and
have high expectations for all. Parents need to be informed
about their students’ progress and schools should have the
power to intervene in cases of parental neglect (Fordham,
1998).
School vouchers relative to public education have
continually garnered support in recent years and seem
inevitable. Some argue that school choice would help
schools improve as they would be competing for students
(Choy, 1997). Advocates state that schools would be more
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receptive to parents and students if school choice were
allowed in the public sector. Parents who are dissatisfied
with the public school have the option of sending their
students to private schools. There are a variety of private
schools available nation-wide including religious
affiliated schools. Private schools charge various amounts
in tuition, and some have stringent enrollment criteria
while others are more lenient. Parents that are more
financially stable are more likely to send their children
to private schools while those students whose parents
cannot afford the tuition are relegated to public schools.
Students from families whose annual income was $15,000 or
less were far more likely to send their children to public
schools versus those families whose income was over $30,000
(Choy, 1997).
Public school teachers typically earn a higher salary
than private school teachers. The qualification
requirements to teach at public school versus private
school also differ significantly. There is more rigor
required to be certified to teach in the public school
setting. As many researchers point out, one of the most
critical components of a student’s academic success relies
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on the quality of the classroom teacher. Teachers in public
schools are far more likely to obtain a master’s degree than
private school teachers. At the high school level, public
school mathematics, foreign language, and English teachers
are far more likely to have majored or minored in the
subject as undergraduates. Private school teachers rarely
are given benefits such as health insurance. Public school
teachers, on the other hand, generally do receive health
insurance as a benefit. Retirement benefits are also a
critical component of the benefit package for public school
educators (Choy, 1997).
The importance of school size has been discussed
frequently in recent years. Larger schools often offer a
wider array of academic course offerings, extracurricular
opportunities, and increased support services. Schools that
are smaller are easier to manage and the feeling of
community is thought to be of great value. As school
leaders attempt to raise the success of students, school
size is important to consider. Teachers whose class sizes
are smaller are able to provide more individualized
attention to their students. Their workload is also
considerably lower and therefore more enviable. Private
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schools often have a more thorough scholastic program.
Students who graduate from private schools are more likely
to have taken advanced mathematics and science classes
(Choy, 1997).
Teacher professional organizations tend to take the
position that pay based on performance can be
counterproductive to collaborative teamwork among teachers
(Blair, 2001). Equitable placement of qualified teachers
can be a problem within a district where certain schools
have more senior teachers and higher performing students
versus the least experienced teachers working in schools
that have a high concentration of poverty and students that
have low academic performance. A second equity issue is
money and the opportunity of wealthier school districts to
provide a broader range of programs and quality teachers
for their students. It is evident that the differences in
community wealth have an impact on the school district's
ability to recruit and retain highly qualified teachers.
Higher salaries, better benefits, signing bonuses, newer
facilities, smaller schools, more resources, more
opportunities for professional development, and larger
budgets for recruiting give the wealthier school districts
an advantage due to the fact they take neighboring school
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district’s best teachers. The issue of financial equity in
schools may not be overcome, even with support from the
federal government (Blair, 2001).
Summary
Classroom teachers are the driving force in any
child’s education. Teacher effectiveness determines whether
students receive a quality education or not. The problem is
that exceptional teachers are not rewarded for their
excellent work, and failing teachers are rarely held
accountable for their poor efforts. The teaching profession
could benefit from compensation systems similar to those
used for other professions. Quality teachers have nothing
to fear from pay-for-performance plans. In order for the
quality of the teaching field to improve, teachers must be
held responsible, paid accordingly, and be given
appropriate professional development to increase student
achievement.

Schools must implement performance pay plans,

replace the teacher tenure system with performance
contracts for teachers, and apply differential pay for the
varied needs of certificated employees.

CHAPTER THREE-DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education (MDESE, 2008) requires the administration of the
Missouri Assessment Program (MAP) to 3rd, 4th and 5th grade
students in the areas of communication arts and
mathematics. These results are posted on the MDESE website.
This research study focused on determining whether or not
teacher compensation correlated with student achievement on
the MAP test.
This chapter outlines the procedures utilized in this
study. The following areas are included: definition of
population and sample, variables studied, research
questions, hypotheses, data analysis, and summary.
Definition of Population and Sample
The population for this study included 300 randomly
selected public school districts in the state of Missouri.
Elementary students in the state of Missouri in grades
three through five are given the MAP examination annually
in communication arts and mathematics. Data files from
MDESE and public information from the DESE website supplied
the necessary information for identifying the sample.
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Variables Studied
MDESE calculated a MAP index score for each school
district by first multiplying the percent of students
scoring at each achievement level by the following values:
Advanced - 3; Proficient - 2.5; Nearing Proficient - 2;
Progressing - 1.5; and Step 1 - 1 (MDESE, 2008). The sum of
these products produced the final MAP index score, which
ranged from 100 to 300. The dependent variables examined in
this study were the MAP index average score as well as
index scores for each subject area in each grade level.
The independent variable for this study was average
teacher salary. Teacher salary data were collected from the
DESE website for 300 randomly selected public school
districts in the state of Missouri.
Research Questions
The following questions guided this study:
1.

Is there a relationship between higher teacher

salaries and higher student Missouri Assessment Program
(MAP) scores?
2.

Does a positive correlation exist between teacher

compensation and elementary student achievement on the MAP?
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Hypotheses
H0: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured by the mean third through fifth grade index
scores.
H1: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the third grade level in communication arts.
H2: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the third grade level in mathematics.
H3: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fourth grade level in communication arts.
H4: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fourth grade level in mathematics.
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H5: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fifth grade level in communication arts.
H6: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fifth grade level in mathematics.
Data Analysis
This data were gathered from 300 randomly selected
Missouri K-12 public school districts using 2007 data. The
data was collected from the Missouri Department of
Elementary and Secondary Education website. The data
included Missouri Assessment Program data as well as
finance data regarding average teacher salary for each
public school district. The data were organized into a
spreadsheet for access by the appropriate statistical
program. A linear regression was used to analyze the
relationship between the independent variable (teacher
salary) and the dependent variable (MAP score). Seven
different linear regressions were conducted: 3rd grade
communication arts, 4th grade communication arts, 5th grade
communication arts, 3rd grade mathematics, 4th grade
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mathematics, 5th grade mathematics, and average MAP index. A
t-test was used to determine significance.
Summary
The study examined elementary MAP scores of 300
randomly selected public schools in Missouri. The dependent
variable was the MAP index scores for students in grades 3
through 5. Independent variables included teachers’ average
salaries. Descriptive statistics identified the mean, range
and standard deviation for each variable. Analyses included
linear regressions to determine the relationship between
the dependent and independent variables.
Chapter Four presented the procedures employed to
analyze the data collected from the study, the study design
that contains the research questions, the null hypotheses,
population sample, data collection, and methods of
analyses.

CHAPTER FOUR-ANALYSIS OF DATA
The purpose of this study was to examine the
relationship between teacher salary and student
achievement. Variables examined included average teacher
salaries from randomly selected schools across the state of
Missouri and student MAP index scores. The dependent
variable was the 2007 MAP index scores for students in
grades 3 through 5. Two areas of academic performance were
investigated, MAP mathematics index scores and MAP
communication arts index scores. The independent variable
was the average teacher salary from school districts across
the state of Missouri.
Population and Sample
The population of this study was 300 randomly selected
school districts in Missouri. The methods used in analyzing
data were descriptive statistics and linear regressions.
The null hypotheses considered in this study were:
H0: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured by the mean third through fifth grade index
scores.
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H1: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the third grade level in communication arts.
H2: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the third grade level in mathematics.
H3: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fourth grade level in communication arts.
H4: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fourth grade level in mathematics.
H5: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fifth grade level in communication arts.
H6: There is no statistically significant correlation
at the .05 level between teacher compensation and student
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academic achievement on the Missouri Assessment Program as
measured at the fifth grade level in mathematics.
Data Collection
Student performance levels on the MAP assessment
ranged from Step 1, Progressing, Nearing Proficient,
Proficient, to Advanced. A MAP index score is calculated by
multiplying the percent of students scoring at each
achievement level by the following values: Advanced - 3,
Proficient - 2.5, Nearing Proficient - 2, Progressing 1.5, and Step 1 - 1. The sum of the products yields the MAP
index score. These MAP index scores for each school
district in this study were averaged to produce a single
MAP index score for each school district. The MAP index
scores ranged from 100 to 300. The MDESE website supplied
the necessary initial MAP index score for each grade level
for each school district.
MDESE’s website provided the 2007 average teacher
salary for each school district. All data was transferred
to an excel spreadsheet and then a linear regression was
conducted to determine the statistical significance.
Method of Statistical Analysis
This study utilized a linear regression and a t-test
as a means of determining statistical significance between
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MAP index scores and average teacher salaries. The
dependent variable was the MAP index score for 3rd grade
communication arts, 4th grade communication arts, 5th grade
communication arts, 3rd grade mathematics, 4th grade
mathematics, 5th grade mathematics and the average MAP index
score. The independent variable was the average teacher
salary. The resulting correlations established a measure
for determining whether or not to accept the null
hypotheses at the .05 level of probability.
Descriptive Findings
Table 1 shows the number of districts, mean, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum values. The values for all
variables showed moderate variability as can be seen from
the standard deviations relative to the value of the means.
The minimum and maximum values are within the acceptable
and expected range for all variables indicating that there
are no extreme values.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for different variables in
the data.
Variable

N

Mean

Std

Minimum

Maximum

Dev
Grade 3 CA MAP Index score

298

751.73

27.17

681.80

880.00

Grade 4 CA MAP Index score

300

751.38

24.57

666.70

877.80

Grade 5 CA MAP Index score

299

753.39

24.65

675.00

877.80

Grade 3 Math MAP Index score

300

747.42

25.17

672.70

835.70

Grade 4 Math MAP Index score

300

745.90

25.49

680.00

860.00

Grade 5 Math MAP Index score

300

751.66

25.69

650.00

853.30

Average MAP index

298

750.27

18.50

698.33

826.85

Ave Teacher Salary

300

34,780

6.46

23,900

62,800

To further investigate the independent variable
(teacher salary) and the dependent variables (MAP indices)
for grades 3, 4, and 5 in Communication Arts and
Mathematics, refer to the Figures in Appendix A.
The dependent variables (student achievement) have a
bell shape and approximate the normal distribution with no
extreme values. The average teacher salary demonstrates
that most of the salaries were in the rage of $28,000 to
$44,000. All the values are within the acceptable range and
no data was regarded as outliers.
To test the possible effect of teacher salary on
student achievement a linear regression was used. The
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following seven analyses were conducted for each of the
measurements of student achievement:
1- MAP index for grade 3 (Communication arts),
2- MAP index for grade 4 (Communication arts),
3- MAP index for grade 5 (Communication arts),
4- MAP index for grade 3 (Mathematics),
5- MAP index for grade 4 (Mathematics),
6- MAP index for grade 5 (Mathematics),
7- Average MAP index
Table 2 illustrates teacher salary had a correlation
on the MAP index for grade 3 in communication arts with Pvalue of <0.01. The slope was positive which indicated that
as teacher salary increased, MAP index for grade 3 in
Communication Arts also increased. The results indicated
that as teacher salary increased by $1,000, MAP index
scores increased .74 units. The null hypothesis for grade 3
communication arts was rejected at the .05 level.
Table 2 indicates a prediction equation of the MAP
index for grade 3 in CA equals (725.84 + 0.74) * average
teacher salary. The analysis also generated the R2 value of
0.0313. This indicated that 3.13% of the variation in
students’ MAP index for grade 3 in Communication Arts can be
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explained by the variation in teacher salary. In other
words, about 3% of the variation in MAP index of grade 3 in
Communication Arts can be attributed to teacher salary.
Table 2. Effect of teacher salary on MAP index for grade 3
(Communication Arts)
Variable

Intercept

DF Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t|

1

Ave Teach Salary 1

Estimate

Error

725.84

8.51

85.34

<0.01

0.74

0.24

3.10

<0.01

Table 3 illustrates teacher salary had a significant
correlation on MAP index for grade 4 in communication arts
with P-value of 0.01. The P-value (significance level) was
significant at the 0.05 level. Evidence indicated teacher
salary was correlated with MAP index for grade 4 in
communication arts.
The slope was positive which indicated as teacher
salary increased, MAP index for grade 4 in communication
arts also increased. The magnitude of this change was
determined by the value of the estimate of the slope. An
increase of 0.56 units in MAP index for grade 4 was
exhibited in communication arts for each one thousand
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dollar increase in the average salary of the teachers. The
null hypothesis for grade 4 communication arts was rejected
at the .05 level.
Table 3 indicated a prediction equation of the MAP
index for grade 4 in communication arts equals (732.05 +
0.56) * average teacher salary. The R2 value in this
analysis was 0.0213. This indicates that 2.13% of the
variation in students’ MAP index for grade 4 in
communication arts can be explained by the variation in
teacher salary. In other words, about 2% of the variation
in MAP index for grade 4 in communication arts can be
attributed to teacher salary.
Table 3. Effect of teacher salary on MAP index for grade 4
(Communication arts)
Variable

Intercept

DF Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t|

1

Ave Teach Salary 1

Estimate

Error

732.05

7.71

94.93

<0.01

0.56

0.22

2.55

0.01

Table 4 illustrates teacher salary had a significant
correlation with MAP index for grade 5 in communication
arts with P-value of less than 0.01. Evidence concluded
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that teacher salary had a correlation with MAP index for
grade 5 in communication arts.
The slope was positive which indicated as teacher
salary increased the MAP index for grade 5 in communication
arts also increased. The magnitude of this change is
determined by the value of the estimate of the slope. An
increase of 0.98 units in MAP index for grade 5 in
communication arts for each one thousand dollar increase in
the average salary of teachers was exhibited. The null
hypothesis for grade 5 communication arts was rejected at
the .05 level.
Table 4 indicates a prediction equation of MAP index
for grade 5 in communication arts equals (719.30 + 0.98) *
average teacher salary.

The R2 value in this analysis was

0.0661. This indicated that 6.61% of the variation in
students’ MAP index for grade 5 in communication arts can be
explained by the variation in teacher salary. In other
words, about 7% of the variation in MAP index for grade 5
in communication arts can be attributed to teacher salary.
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Table 4. Effect of teacher salary on MAP index for grade 5
(Communication arts)
Variable

Intercept

DF Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t|

1

Ave Teach Salary 1

Estimate

Error

719.30

7.56

95.14

<0.01

0.98

0.21

4.59

<0.01

Table 5 illustrates teacher salary had a significant
correlation with MAP index for grade 3 in math with P-value
of less than 0.01. Evidence concluded that teacher salary
had a true effect on MAP index for grade 3 in math.
The slope was positive which indicated as teacher
salary increased the MAP index for grade 3 in math also
increased. The magnitude of this change is determined by
the value of the estimate of the slope. An increase of 0.83
units in MAP index for grade 3 in math was exhibited for
each one thousand dollar increase in the average salary of
the teachers. The null hypothesis for grade 3 mathematics
was rejected at the .05 level.
Table 5 indicates a prediction equation of MAP index
for grade 3 in math equals (718.59 + 0.83) * average
teacher salary. The R2 value in this analysis was 0.0453.
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This indicates that 4.53% of the variation in students’ MAP
index for grade 3 in math can be explained by the variation
in teacher salary.
Table 5. Effect of teacher salary on MAP index for grade 3
(Mathematics)
Variable

Intercept

DF Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t|

1

Ave Teach Salary 1

Estimate

Error

718.59

7.80

92.10

<0.01

0.83

0.22

3.76

<0.02

Table 6 illustrated teacher salary had a significant
correlation with MAP index for grade 4 in math with P-value
of 0.02. The P-value (significance level) was significant
at the 0.05 level. Evidence indicated teacher salary had a
true effect on MAP index for grade 4 in math.
The slope was positive which indicated as teacher
salary increased, the MAP index for grade 4 in math also
increased. An increase of 0.54 units in MAP index for grade
4 in math was exhibited for each one thousand dollar
increase in the average salary of the teachers. The null
hypothesis for grade 4 mathematics was rejected at the .05
level.
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Table 6 indicates a prediction equation of MAP index
for grade 3 in math equals (727.24 + 0.54) * average
teacher salary. The R2 value in this analysis was 0.0185.
This indicated that 1.85% of the variation in students’ MAP
index for grade 4 in math can be explained by the variation
in teacher salary.
Table 6. Effect of teacher salary on MAP index for grade 4
(Mathematics)
Variable

Intercept

DF Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t|

1

Ave Teach Salary 1

Estimate

Error

727.24

8.01

90.78

<0.01

0.54

0.23

2.37

0.02

Table 7 illustrates teacher salary had a significant
correlation with MAP index for grade 5 in math with P-value
of 0.01. The P-value (significance level) was significant
at the 0.05 level. Evidence indicated teacher salary had a
true effect on MAP index for grade 5 in math.
The slope was positive which indicated as teacher
salary increased, the MAP index for grade 5 in math also
increased. An increase of 0.57 units in MAP index for grade
5 in math was exhibited for each one thousand dollar
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increase in the average salary of the teachers. The null
hypothesis for grade 5 mathematics was rejected at the .05
level.
Table 7 indicates a prediction equation of MAP index
for grade 5 in math equals (731.89 + 0.57) * average
teacher salary. The R2 value in this analysis was 0.0204.
This indicated that 2.04% of the variation in students’ MAP
index for grade 5 in math can be explained by the variation
in teacher salary.
Table 7. Effect of teacher salary on MAP index for grade 5
(Mathematics)
Variable

Intercept

DF Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t|

1

Ave Teach Salary 1

Estimate

Error

731.89

8.07

90.75

<0.01

0.57

0.23

2.49

0.01

Table 8 illustrated teacher salary had a significant
correlation with MAP index for the overall average with Pvalue of 0.01. The P-value (significance level) was
significant at the 0.05 level. Evidence indicated teacher
salary had a true effect on MAP index.
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The slope was positive which indicated as teacher
salary increased the MAP index also increased. An increase
of 0.70 units in MAP index for grade 5 in math for each one
thousand dollar increase in the average salary of the
teachers could be expected.
Table 8 indicated a prediction equation of MAP index
equals (725.82 + 0.70) * average teacher salary.

The R2

value in this analysis was 0.0603. This indicated that
6.03% of the variation in students’ average MAP index can be
explained by the variation in teacher salary.
Table 8. Effect of teacher salary on Average MAP index
Variable

Intercept

DF Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t|

1

Ave Teach Salary 1

Estimate

Error

725.82

5.70

127.29

<0.01

0.70

0.16

4.36

<0.01

The null hypothesis proposed no statistically
significant correlation at the .05 level between student
achievement as measured by the MAP index scores and teacher
salaries.
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Summary of Findings
This chapter presented the descriptive data obtained
for each of the variables listed. The data collected
represents 300 Missouri public schools.
Chapter Five provides the summary, discussion,
conclusions, and recommendations that resulted from this
study.

CHAPTER FIVE-CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
NCLB mandates all students be proficient in
communication arts and mathematics by 2014. School
districts across the nation are desperately trying to
achieve the NCLB requirement. Dollars are being spent in
various ways to garner high student achievement scores
(Jennings, 2006).
This study was designed to determine a differential in
student achievement scores amongst schools that had a
higher teacher salary and those that did not.
The study reviewed literature and research that
provided information on the following: (1) research on
teacher salary schedules, (2) student achievement testing,
(3) socioeconomic factors and school expenditures, (4)
supplemental salary options, and (5) accountability
measures. Data for this study was provided by the Missouri
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. This
study utilized descriptive statistics and correlations to
determine patterns and relationships that affect the
achievement of students on the Missouri Assessment Program.
Discussion
Results of the study suggest that MAP index scores for
school districts that have a higher average teacher salary
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were significantly higher than those school districts that
had a lower average teacher salary. This trend suggests
that school districts can entice more productive, effective
teachers with higher salaries.
Based on the results of this study, the academic
performance of students did appear to be affected by
teacher’s salary.
Conclusion
Teachers’ salary was found to have a significant
influence on student achievement as measured by MAP index
in grades 3, 4, and 5 in mathematics, and communication
arts and in average MAP index. The effect of teacher’s
salary on student achievement was found to be favorable and
student achievement was found to improve with the increase
in teacher’s salary. However, only a small proportion
(ranging from 2 to 7%) of the variability in students’
achievement can be attributed to differences in teacher’s
salary.
Significant factors that were not accounted for in
this study include: number of students receiving free or
reduced-price lunches, advanced degrees of teachers
involved, and median household income of parents.
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Accountability for public schools across the nation is
at an all time high. Adequate Yearly Progress expectations
of NCLB require all students to be proficient in reading
and mathematics by 2014. As school districts examine the
best use of financial resources, it is imperative that
appropriate use of those dollars be attained.
Recommendations
School districts should examine the manner in which
funds are distributed and recognize higher teacher salary
does not always equate to higher student test scores.
Recommendations for future research include: (1) examine
the percent of free or reduced-price lunch students in each
of the schools listed, (2) examine other factors that
motivate teachers besides monetary compensation such as
school climate, professional development, and working
conditions, and (3) investigate other areas that impact
student achievement scores.
Summary
This study showed a significant correlation existed
between student achievement scores on the MAP and teacher
salary during the 2006 – 2007 school year. Student
achievement was measured in grades 3, 4, and 5 in
mathematics and communication arts and in average MAP index

Teacher Compensation
scores. All seven student achievement areas displayed a
significant correlation.
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Figure 1. MAP index for grade 3 communication arts, 20062007
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Figure 2. MAP index for grade 4 communication arts, 20062007
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